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I. INTRODUCTION
Markets are not natural. Adam Smith noted that mankind has “the
propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another,”1 but
markets require more than mere exchange, which is present not only in all
human societies but also among certain primates.2 Rather, healthy markets
consist of the widespread allocation of goods and services through a
repeated and ongoing process of impersonal exchange among large groups
of people without resort to violent expropriation or other forms of
predation.
Consider the example of Russia in the early 1990s. In the wake of the
failed coup by hard-line communists, the Soviet Union formally dissolved,
and the Russian government faced the daunting task of transitioning from
an economy in which goods and services were ostensibly allocated by state
fiat to markets.3 Russian policymakers, acting on the advice of Western
economists, opted for a policy of “shock therapy.”4 Every Russian citizen
would be given a share of stock entitling them to some fractional equity
ownership of state-owned enterprises.5 The hope was that simply transferring
ownership to private hands would create incentives that would lead to the
creation of healthy markets.6 While the shock therapy did achieve its main
political objective of forestalling a return to communism, it was not a
startling economic success.7 In some segments of the Russian economy,
healthy markets developed, but criminal and quasi-criminal oligarchs whose
wealth rested in large part on extortion and allies within the state came to
dominate other sectors.8

1. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 11 (C.J. Bullock ed., Barnes & Noble 2004)
(1776).
2. In experiments with humans, chimpanzees demonstrate the ability to trade food,
including evidence of a conscious strategy of maximizing their gains from trade. See Louis
Lefebvre, Food Exchange Strategies in an Infant Chimpanzee, 11 J. HUM. EVOLUTION 195 (1982).
While chimps have this ability, however, they have not been observed trading in the wild. Id. at
201 (“Food exchange can be thus added to the growing list of sophisticated abilities great apes
show in captivity but do not use in the wild.”).
3. See generally MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN, THE PIRATIZATION OF RUSSIA: RUSSIAN REFORM
GOES AWRY 45–70 (2003) (discussing economic conditions in Russia on the eve of
privatization).
4. See id. at 58–65 (describing the motivations of Yeltsin’s key economic advisors in
implementing “shock therapy” for the Russian economy).
5. See id. at 86.
6. See id.
7. See PREM SHANKAR JHA, THE PERILOUS ROAD TO THE MARKET: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF REFORM IN RUSSIA, INDIA AND CHINA 36–56 (2002) (discussing the effects of Yeltsin’s “shock
therapy” on Russian society).
8. See id. at 37 (“The Mafiya controlled prices and rapidly developed an interest in
ensuring that increases in supply that would force prices down did not reach the market. . . . It
also controlled the entry of new small businesses, and thereby choked the growth of
entrepreneurship in the country.”).
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Historically, the Russian experience is unsurprising. Commerce and
markets on a limited scale, of course, are common across time and space.
There was trade in ancient Egypt and ancient China.9 On the other hand, in
many societies impersonal voluntary exchange accounted for a relatively
small share of economic activity. Consider, for example, the economic
organization of the Roman Empire. To be sure, there was trade and
commerce, often on a large scale.10 On the other hand, subsistence
agriculture, slavery, and various forms of expropriation such as tax farming
accounted for the bulk of economic activity. In human history, the
dominance of economic life by healthy markets has been the exception
rather than the rule. Indeed, modern economists have noted that even today
most societies are dominated by a social model where “[p]ersonal
relationships, who one is and who one knows, form the basis for social
organization and constitute the arena for individual interaction, particularly
personal relationships among powerful individuals.”11 In contrast, the
set of changes in the economy that ensure open entry and
competition in many markets, free movement of goods and
individuals over space and time, the ability to create organizations
to pursue economic opportunities, protection of property rights,
and prohibitions on the use of violence to obtain resources and
goods or to coerce others12
is rare both historically and globally.
Foregrounding the contingency of healthy markets has potentially
important implications for legal theory, particularly for our thinking about
bodies of law such as contracts that are closely associated with markets. An
assumption that markets are natural or given focuses attention on the role of
law as a regulator, a social mechanism for ferreting out and suppressing
markets in their pathological inflection. If, on the other hand, we see
markets as fragile and contingent, we focus our attention on a different set
of questions, the questions that I seek to discuss in this Article.
Contract law is the quintessential institution of a market economy.
Indeed, historically, contract was a late arrival to the common law. For the
first several centuries of its existence, the common law focused mainly on
issues of personal security—what today we would call torts and criminal
law—and the rights and duties associated with property, especially real

9. See WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, A SPLENDID EXCHANGE: HOW TRADE SHAPED THE WORLD 20–
28 (2008) (discussing international trade in the ancient societies of the Fertile Crescent).
10. See id. at 40–42 (discussing trade in the Roman Empire).
11. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, JOHN JOSEPH WALLIS & BARRY R. WEINGAST, VIOLENCE AND
SOCIAL ORDERS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED HUMAN HISTORY 2
(2009).
12. Id.
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property.13 It was only in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that
contract law became the topic of extensive doctrinal elaboration by the
courts,14 and it was only in the nineteenth century that contract reached a
state of doctrinal maturity.15 This does not mean, of course, that there was
no legal enforcement of voluntary, executory agreements prior to the early
modern period. Roman law recognized a variety of contractual forms, and
writs such as debt, covenant, and assumpsit existed at common law.
Nevertheless, contract did not receive the kind of sustained attention
lavished, for example, on the law of real property.
It is not accidental that the rise of judicial attention to contract
corresponds with the massive explosion in market activity and economic
growth over the same period. Indeed, the period beginning in the
eighteenth century marks a kind of big bang for economic growth.16 After
millennia of either stagnant or modest increases in material prosperity,
something unprecedented began happening first in the economies of the
Netherlands and Britain and then in North America and the rest of
northwestern Europe.17 Economic activity spiked upward and entered a
period of sustained, exponential growth that accelerated after the year 1800
and left the inhabitants of these nations wealthier on average than any other
societies in the history of the globe.18 Contract law is a creation of this
period.
Despite the close historical connection between the triumph of markets
and the rise of contract law, markets play a remarkably small role in contract
law theory, particularly those theories we might label as moral or
philosophical.19 Of course, there were contracts and contract law before the
economic explosion of the last three hundred years, and in any case, the
historical fact that contract law ballooned in importance with the rise of

13. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 628–32
(Little, Brown & Co. 5th ed. 1956) (1929) (discussing the history of the common law and the
origins of contract law).
14. The beginning of this process is traditionally ascribed to the decision of the Court of
King’s Bench in Slade’s Case, (1602) 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B.); 4 Co. Rep. 92b.
15. See generally P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979).
16. See DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, BOURGEOIS DIGNITY: WHY ECONOMICS CAN’T EXPLAIN THE
MODERN WORLD 1 (2010) (“One hundred dollars as against three: such is the magnitude of
modern economic growth.”).
17. See id. at 7–8 (“In northwestern Europe around 1700 the general opinion shifted in
favor of the bourgeoisie, and especially in favor of its marketing and innovating. . . . But for
millennia no blade of the hockey stick ensued. When ideology changed, it did.” (footnote
omitted)).
18. See id. at 4 (“As a share of all the world’s population the world’s poverty has been falling
not for two decades but for two centuries. A higher and higher share have become since 1800
those $30- or $48- or $137- or $280-a-day folk, in the top four to six billion.”).
19. For example, the index in Stephen Smith’s excellent survey of the contemporary
philosophy of contract law, Contract Theory, does not contain an entry on markets. See STEPHEN
A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 449 (2004).
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markets doesn’t mean that there is any necessary connection between
markets and the criticism, justification, and interpretation of contract law.
Likewise, markets are not entirely absent from contemporary contract law
theory. Economic theorists of contract certainly laud markets, and their
approach to contract law tends to focus on market participants. Generally,
however, the law and economics focus on markets reduces to a single
concern: the efficient allocation of resources. Markets, however, are
complex social institutions that can serve multiple functions.20 They do far
more than simply allocate resources, and our understanding of their
workings and possible social functions cannot be exhausted by the tools of
the rational-actor model and efficiency analysis.
In this Article, I hope to show why the philosophical indifference of
contract theorists to markets is a mistake. I do this by focusing on promissory
theories of contract, showing how they could be strengthened by focusing
on the role of promises in markets rather than on promissory morality
simpliciter. My thesis is that contract law exists primarily to support markets
and that the moral and political value of markets as a social institution
undergirds its justification. I realize, of course, that the universe of contract
theory is hardly exhausted by promissory theories. My focus on promissory
theories is pragmatic. I address these theories as a way of illustrating my
central thesis, but I understand that ultimately a full discussion of that thesis
requires grappling with other theoretical approaches to contract such as
consent and transfer theories. That, however, is a task for a different article.
I begin my argument by critiquing the normative foundations of
efficiency analysis. This is well-worn ground, but it is worth traversing again
as a prelude to the argument that follows. Markets are so often justified as
being efficient that it can be difficult for people to think about their value in
any other terms. In order to clarify the nature of the claims I am making in
this Article, therefore, I want to be very clear that I am not offering a
justification for markets based on efficiency. Indeed, when the term
“efficiency” is rigorously specified using the tools of welfare economics, it
cannot justify markets as they actually exist. Any justification for the unruly
reality of markets must lie elsewhere. The next step in my argument is to
provide such a justification. Broadly speaking, the good of markets can be
understood in three ways. First, markets reinforce a liberal political order.
Second, markets generate wealth, which helps to deliver a host of social
goods from health care to religious tolerance. Third, I argue that the
process of market exchange inculcates a set of virtues that makes us into
more peaceful, tolerant, and decent human beings.

20. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003) (arguing that economic efficiency should be the sole concern
governing firm-to-firm contracts).
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Having established the goodness of markets, I next discuss how contract
law is justified as supporting markets. I do this by contrasting the support of
markets as a justification for contract law with well-known promissory
theories, showing how such theories fail at precisely the point where a
market-supporting view of contract succeeds. Markets, however, are not an
absolute good. At times they operate in ways that we should find normatively
troubling. In these situations, markets do not provide a justification for
contractual enforcement. Accordingly, I conclude that limitations on
freedom of contract such as the rule against immoral contracts, far from
being a paternalistic intrusion into the libertarian purity of contract, flow
naturally from contract’s role as a market-sustaining institution. In short,
markets are not a happy by-product of enforcing contracts for other reasons.
They are the primary justification for the existence of contract law.
I proceed as follows. In Part II, I address efficiency defenses of the
market, showing why they are inadequate and require that we understand
the value of markets using tools beyond those that traditional welfare
economics and the model of perfect competition provide. In Part III, I
discuss noneconomic reasons why markets are politically and morally
desirable. In Part IV, I argue that seeing contract law as facilitating markets
provides a more coherent normative theory than promissory theories of
contract. Part V considers objections to the moral status of markets and how
these objections might play out in contract law. Part VI concludes.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH THE EFFICIENCY DEFENSE OF MARKETS
It is important to understand that focusing on the value of markets is
not the same thing as ordinary efficiency analysis. Of course, economists
frequently celebrate the virtues of markets. It is thus ironic that economics
itself demonstrates the difficulty of defending markets on efficiency
grounds. If markets are inhabited by rational actors who face no transaction
costs, then neoclassical theory has thoroughly demonstrated that the
resulting distribution of resources will be efficient.21 There will be an
incentive to engage in trades that result in Pareto-superior allocations of
resources, and all available Pareto-superior moves will, in due course, be
made. The result will be a Pareto-optimal distribution. We will have a world
in which any deviation from the market allocation will result in at least one
person being made worse off. Accordingly, markets are to be desired for
their ability to achieve efficient outcomes. It is a beguiling vision, and one
that is supported by arguments whose formal validity cannot be seriously

21. This, roughly stated, is the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics. This
theorem states that the competitive or Walrasian equilibrium of a market will be efficient. See
generally Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy,
22 ECONOMETRICA 265 (1954) (offering the first formal proof for this claim).
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questioned.22 The problem with this defense of markets is that its
assumptions are demonstrably false.
The first assumption is that market participants are rational actors.
Economic rationality needn’t mean that agents conform to some vision of
homo economicus in which wealth is the only goal and the accumulation of
money is the highest good.23 For example, there is nothing economically
irrational about the actions of Mother Teresa. This is because the demands
of economic rationality are purely formal. To be economically rational, one
must have preferences that are complete and transitive.24 For any choice
between A and B, the rational actor must have a preference for A or B.
Furthermore, if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then A must be
preferred to C. These preferences must be stable over time, and the agent
must act in accordance with them. Economic analysis, however, has nothing
to say about the content of A, B, or C. There is nothing irrational about
preferring a life of selfless sacrifice in the slums of Calcutta to a life of selfindulgent leisure, so long as it is also true that when self-indulgent leisure is
preferred to a life of playing professional chess then selfless sacrifice is also
preferred to chess. Thus, the rational-actor model can be saved from crude
economic skepticism.
The rational-actor model, however, faces a far deeper challenge from
behavioral studies.25 Rather than attacking a caricature of homo economicus,
behavioral work suggests that the formal requirements of the rational-actor
model do not hold. Most of us, it would seem, do not have complete
transitive preferences. There may be gaps between our preferences and our
actions. Actual human beings are prone to misperceptions and akrasia.
Furthermore, we may be indecisive about what we desire and inconsistent
over relatively short periods of time in what we pursue.26 One minute we
want A rather than B, but the next minute prefer B to A. On occasion we
prefer A to B and B to C, but—in the face of the demands of the rationalactor model—we may prefer C to A.
There are, of course, perfectly respectable reasons to remain sanguine
about the power of the rational-actor model in the face of such criticisms.
First, most of the behavioral studies occur in carefully structured
experimental settings where the surprising results—such as the intransitivity

22. Kenneth Arrow is generally credited with producing a mathematical proof for the first
fundamental theorem. See generally id.
23. See ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 65–74 (1988) (discussing
the formal requirements of the rational-actor model).
24. Id. at 69.
25. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 1, 1–10 (Cass
R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (summarizing research in behavioral law and economics).
26. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 25, at 211–
31.
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of preferences—can be altered by very small changes in experimental
design.27 One can plausibly claim, for example, that as scientific conclusions
they lack the robustness of the laws of thermodynamics or—for that
matter—the almost universally observed inverse relationship between the
demand and the price of any good or service.28 Another response is to note
that most economic decisions are made in institutional or social settings that
militate against the kind of formal irrationality apparently observed by
behavioral critics.29 For example, when modeling the behavior of firms one
might assume economic rationality because competitive forces tend to weed
out formal irrationality.30 These all strike me as fair defenses of the rationalactor model, suggesting that, with caveats, it can still be employed without
embarrassment in modeling a great deal of economic behavior.
The deeper problem with an economic defense of markets is the
ubiquity of transaction costs. Remember that in order to justify markets as
efficient, agents must be rational and face zero transaction costs. There are
few markets where the assumption of zero transaction costs, or something
like that, holds. Market actors in the real world face ubiquitous information
costs, bargaining costs, search costs, and the like. These transaction costs
cannot be dismissed as negligible frictions. To grasp why this is so, consider
sectors of the economy that exist more or less entirely as a transaction cost.
Accountants, for example, exist to solve information costs by providing
information about the present value of firms. Lawyers exist to help
individuals and firms negotiate the cost of discovering, obeying, and
disputing the law or else in negotiating and interpreting the scope of
contractual obligations. Brokers of various kinds exist to solve the search
costs that willing buyers and sellers otherwise face. And so on. Indeed, one
study concluded that roughly forty percent of the entire U.S. economy
consisted of private transaction costs.31 Such costs cannot be dismissed as
mere friction contained within the rounding error of economic models.
Rather, high transaction costs are the norm.
All of this means that the two key assumptions necessary to defend
markets as efficient seldom actually hold true in fact. We simply are not
justified in supposing that the allocation of resources resulting from actual
markets in the real world is efficient. Indeed, seen in terms of the conditions

27. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for
Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72 (2002) (stating that
theories associated with behavioral law and economics “cannot lay claim to empirical validity
superior to that of the perfect rationality assumption” of law and economics).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 74–75.
30. See id. at 73–77.
31. See John Joseph Wallis & Douglass C. North, Measuring the Transaction Sector in the
American Economy, 1870–1970, in LONG-TERM FACTORS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 95,
121 tbl.3.13 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., paperback ed. 1992).
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for an efficient market, most market activity is actually an unfortunate
transaction cost. The process of exchange, shopping, bargaining,
persuading, building relationships with customers and suppliers,
experimenting with new business models, creating new products, trying new
services, and the like are all so much waste. In the theoretical construct of
perfect competition, such activities should not exist and goods and services
should instantaneously and costlessly converge on an efficient equilibrium
point. It is this efficient equilibrium, rather than market activity per se, that
is the normative goal of economic theories. In the end, however, any
discussion of markets must assume that we are not in the world of perfect
competition and zero transaction costs.
This does not, of course, mean that one cannot make efficiency
arguments in favor of markets. Nor is it a criticism of economic analysis of
the law. The efficiency of markets can still be defended on comparative
grounds. Hence, one might acknowledge deviations from the rational-actor
model and the ubiquity of transaction costs but still argue that markets are
economically preferable to alternative forms of economic organization,
especially the allocation of resources by government fiat. This, for example,
was the gravamen of Friedrich Hayek’s brilliant defense of markets during
the so-called socialist economic-calculation debates of the 1930s and 1940s.
Hayek did not defend markets as perfectly efficient.32 Rather, he noted the
massive information problems faced by government decision makers and
argued that, through the price mechanism, markets were better able to
aggregate the decentralized information in society needed for rational
decision making.33
Likewise, the fact that one cannot ultimately defend real-world markets
as efficient using the simple models of neoclassical economics is not
necessarily a critique of the efficiency analysis of ordinary law and
economics. Indeed, since Ronald Coase, law and economics has assumed
that the ubiquity of transaction costs must be the starting point for the
economic analysis of legal rules.34 There is a real sense in which the work of
someone like Richard Posner is less a defense of the market than a series of
ingenious suggestions as to how market outcomes can be improved by taking
transaction costs into account and specifying legal rules that are more
efficient in light of those costs.35 Indeed, the Coase Theorem suggests that if
the conditions hold for claiming that a market is efficient, the structure of

32. See generally Bruce Caldwell, Hayek and Socialism, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1856 (1997);
Günther K. Chaloupek, The Austrian Debate on Economic Calculation in a Socialist Economy, 22 HIST.
POL. ECON. 659 (1990).
33. See generally F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
34. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
35. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2011).
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legal entitlements is generally irrelevant.36 Law and economics scholarship
thus shows us ways in which the legal system might be made marginally more
efficient. What that scholarship does not do is provide us with an argument
as to why actual markets—as opposed to the frictionless fictions of
introductory textbooks—are valuable. One might take the existence of such
markets as given and ask how they might be improved so as to be more
efficient, but there is no reason why—given a different set of historical
accidents—one might not take the hierarchical organized economy of the
Roman Empire or some other economic system as given and use law and
economics analysis to show how it could be made marginally more efficient.
Even if markets are efficient, the normative credentials of efficiency as a
policy goal are open to serious question. When one makes the claim that
markets—given certain conditions—are efficient, it is important to
understand exactly what is meant by “efficient.” In this claim, what it means
for a market to be efficient is that it will result in a Pareto-optimal allocation
of resources. There is no reason, however, to suppose that bare Pareto
optimality is normatively desirable.37 The allocation of resources resulting
from theft can be Pareto-optimal. If a wealthy glutton steals the last morsel
of food from a starving child, the allocation will be efficient so long as the
glutton prefers having the morsel of food to not having the morsel of food.
Taking the morsel from the glutton and returning it to the child will, after
all, result in the glutton being worse off, violating the Pareto requirement.
Of course, once the morsel is returned to the child, the restored allocation
may itself also be Pareto-optimal. This analysis suggests, however, that the
mere fact that a state of affairs is Pareto-optimal tells us relatively little about
its ultimate desirability. Certainly, a defense of markets based on their Pareto
optimality, without more, has very little to recommend it, even if the
implausible assumptions of zero transaction costs and perfect rationality are
satisfied.
Finally, it is worth noting that the utilitarian foundations of welfarist
justifications for efficiency are open to serious question. The discussion of
efficiency above speaks in terms of preferences and their satisfaction. The
idea is that the satisfaction of a preference, all else being equal, is a good
thing that increases human welfare or is otherwise normatively desirable.
The notion of efficiency, however, is indifferent to the substantive content of
these preferences. Rather, that notion takes preferences to be exogenous to
the analysis, a pre-existing fact about the universe. This approach, however,
runs counter to our moral common sense. Ordinarily, we do not regard
preferences as matters of moral indifference that present a merely technical

36. See Coase, supra note 34, at 6–8 (noting that in a world of zero transaction costs any
initial allocation of an entitlement will result in an efficient final allocation).
37. See Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 637, 637–38
(1992).
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problem of aggregation and maximization. Rather, we regard some
preferences as good and others as bad. The person with a preference for
sadistic killing is not merely a person with a taste that happens to have a
negative externality. He is a moral monster, and we are right to regard him
as such. Likewise, we tend to believe that certain preferences are higher or
nobler than others. A person who desires to help or relieve the suffering of
others is, for that reason, deserving of praise that is not due to someone with
a preference for playing video games. Efficiency analysis, however, provides
us with no traction in making such judgments, but rather, requires that we
take all preferences as given and unquestionable.
In short, in thinking about the value of the actual markets that we
encounter in the real world, traditional economic analysis in its normative
guise provides us with less guidance than one might initially assume. At best,
actual markets emerge from the argument as a kind of compromised version
of a theoretical ideal. Most strikingly, many of the quintessential activities of
the market, such as bargaining, exchange, experimentation, and the like,
are revealed as so many transaction costs; perhaps inevitable but ultimately
wasteful. Economics, whatever its virtues as a theory of social explanation
(and I believe it has many virtues) or as a method for prescribing marginal
improvements to institutions, does not provide a strong defense of markets
in general.
III. THE NON-EFFICIENCY CASE FOR MARKETS
As mentioned above, markets are most often defended as mechanisms
for the efficient allocation of resources. The process of widespread
exchange, however, yields greater benefits than conversion on an efficient
equilibrium point. Indeed, in many ways efficiency in the abstract sense
championed by economic analysis of the law is among the least of the many
virtues of markets. These other values can be divided into three basic
spheres: politics, wealth, and virtue. These spheres are necessarily related to
one another, but for ease of exposition, I will treat each one separately.
A. POLITICS
Eighteenth-century writers often spoke of the political benefits of a
commercial society.38 Thinkers, such as Montesquieu and Adam Smith,
contrasted the emerging world of commerce with the largely precommercial
past.39 They contrasted commercial society with the ethos of the feudal past,
38.

See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS
70–93 (1977) (discussing eighteenth-century debates over
commerce). See generally COMMERCE, CULTURE, AND LIBERTY: READINGS ON CAPITALISM BEFORE
ADAM SMITH (Henry C. Clark ed., 2003) (collecting sources on the eighteenth-century debates
over commerce).
39. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 38, at 9–12 (discussing “The Idea of Glory and Its
Downfall”).

FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH
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in which bravery, loyalty, obedience to hierarchy, and the like were
exalted.40 For these early evangelists of the market, commerce did much
more than make men rich. It made them “gentle,” not simply in the sense of
being less violent but also in the sense of being more refined, thoughtful,
and tolerant. In commercial society, men were more sociable, the arts and
philosophy could flourish more freely, the peace of the commonwealth was
less likely to be excited by the violence of religious fanaticism, and true piety
could develop without the threat of coercion from a state whose energy was
devoted to the cultivation of commerce rather than orthodoxy.41 To be sure,
these theorists worried about the negative effects of commerce. They spoke
of the vices of luxury that wealth could bring, but on the whole, they viewed
the growth of markets as a beneficent moral force in society.42
These arguments can be transposed into the language of modern
political philosophy. Much of liberal theory, for example, insists on the need
to distinguish between the right—the minimum demands that justice places
on each agent to respect the rights of other agents—and the good—the
comprehensive systems of beliefs about final moral ends that agents hold.43
The value of liberal political institutions, on this view, lies in their ability to
provide a peaceful modus vivendi for those with sharply differing visions of
the good. The liberal state should respect the demands of the right while
remaining neutral with regard to competing visions of the good. Ironically,
however, in pluralistic societies, the market provides a much better example
of cooperation among those with competing visions of the good than does
politics. Despite the dream of a neutral state whose actions are justified by a
thin, public reason, politics as it is actually practiced in liberal societies is
frequently bitter, polarizing, and acrimonious. In the marketplace, however,
those with sharply competing political, moral, and religious visions

40.
41.

See id.
See id. at 63–66 (discussing “Money-Making as a Calm Passion”); MONTESQUIEU, THE
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XX, ch. 2, at 338 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1989) (1748) (“The natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations that
trade with each other become reciprocally dependent; if one has an interest in buying, the
other has an interest in selling, and thus all unions are founded on mutual needs.”).
42. See 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 794 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., LibertyClassics 1981) (1776) (“In every civilized
society, in every society where the distinction of ranks has once been completely established,
there have been always two different schemes or systems of morality current at the same time; of
which the one may be called the strict or austere; the other the liberal or, if you will, the loose
system. . . . In the liberal or loose system, luxury, wanton and even disorderly mirth, the pursuit
of pleasure to some degree of intemperance, the breach of chastity, at least in one of the two
sexes . . . are generally treated with a good deal of indulgence . . . .”).
43. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 392–96 (rev. ed. 1999) (discussing the
distinction between the right and the good); see also STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS
AND COMMUNITARIANS 31–33 (1992) (same).
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peacefully cooperate.44 This cooperation is so pervasive that we seldom
realize how remarkable it is. Well-functioning markets are perhaps of the
single most effective social practice for managing the pluralism of
incommensurable beliefs.
Liberal political theory has searched for a solution to the problem of
apparently incommensurable and irreducible moral pluralism through some
kind of discursive mechanism. For example, the idea of public reason
imagines a coercive state, but one whose ability to engage in legitimate
collective decisions is sharply limited by the kinds of reasons that may be
offered in support of those decisions.45 In effect, the boundaries of a certain
way of talking become the boundaries of legitimate collective action via the
state, and the boundaries of the discussion are set in such a way as to
manage the pluralism of ultimate moral or political commitments. The
problem with this way of managing pluralism is that as a practical matter it
requires citizens to engage in an epistemic and rhetorical continence in
which their deepest personal convictions and sense of identity are
systematically suppressed in public.46 Regardless of the ultimate rightness of
such a strategy, it has not proved especially successful in practice.47 Modern
politics, even in well-functioning liberal democracies, frequently and
inevitably features appeals beyond a thin conception of public reason.48
Another alternative is to simply limit the reach of the state—and
therefore the destructive possibilities of politically clashing moral
absolutisms—by carving out a private realm that is to be free of political
intrusion. Much of the traditional theory of individual rights is devoted to
defining the limits of this protected space. Likewise, much of constitutional
theory is devoted to the design of institutions that will prevent the state from
growing too large and assertive at the expense of the protected sphere of the
individual. Laudable as such efforts are, however, they are insufficient to
accomplish the goals to which they are set. Historically, well-specified
44. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 5 (1992) (“Markets maximize social
interaction without individuals first being required to agree upon fundamental social values or
to share a conception of the good or of the constitutive elements of the good life.”).
45. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212–54 (1993) (setting forth a defense of the
idea of public reason).
46. See STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 13–18 (2010)
(summarizing the idea of public reason and contrasting it with earlier, more ambitious ideas of
reason); see also RAWLS, supra note 45, at 216–20 (defending the idea of public reason).
47. See SMITH, supra note 46, at 26–27 (“Our modern secular vocabulary purports to
render inadmissible notions such as those that animated premodern moral discourse—notions
about a purposive cosmos, or a teleological nature stocked with Aristotelian ‘final causes,’ or a
providential design. But if our deepest convictions rely on such notions, and if these convictions
lose their sense and substance when divorced from such notions, then perhaps we have little
choice except to smuggle such notions into the conversation—to introduce them incognito
under some sort of secular disguise.”).
48. See id. at 27 (“Such smuggling is, I happen to think, ubiquitous in modern public
discourse.”).
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theories of rights and well-designed political institutions, standing alone,
have proven insufficient to prevent either the chaos of clashing moral visions
or the capture of the coercive capacity of the state by one totalizing moral
vision. Rather, the apparatus of rights and constitutional design must always
rest on broader foundation of social practices that facilitate the liberal
order.
Markets provide a powerful response to the dilemma of moral pluralism
within a liberal order. As Albert Hirschman observed, the pre-classical
theorists of the market saw commerce as harnessing people’s interests to
control their passions.49 One can think of intense moral convictions as a
kind of passion, a reason and a motivation that tends to push a believer
towards extreme forms of action. Market participants, however, do not
appeal to the passions, convictions, and deepest beliefs of those with whom
they deal. As Adam Smith observed, “It is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their
regard to their own interest.”50 In offering a means by which market
participants may advance their interests by cooperating with those whose
beliefs they may otherwise despise, markets provide powerful incentives to
control the forces that disturb the sleep of liberal theorists. One can see the
effectiveness of this approach by considering the relative ease with which
those who have sharply differing religious, political, and moral convictions
work peacefully with one another as employees of a private corporation or
contracting partners in a market exchange. The appeal to the interests, as
Hirschman puts it, proves far more powerful than an appeal to the
rhetorical abstemiousness of public reason.
Markets also are an effective way of limiting the reach of the state. If
rights seek to define the parameters of what the state may legitimately do to
its citizens, and if constitutional design seeks to limit the state through its
internal architecture, then the market provides a resisting medium in which
an expanding state must move if it is to aggrandize itself at the expense of
others. Of course, in practice the market is interpenetrated by the state,
which provides such basic institutions as protection for private property and
contract law. Markets may exist in the absence of such institutions, but they
are likely to be far less robust than their formal counterparts.51 Nevertheless,
the market provides at least a semi-autonomous realm in which concerns
other than those that drive politics are the dominant motivations. The result
is an endlessly complex web of relationships and interests between
innumerable private parties that will tend to resist the encroachments of the
49. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 38, at 31–42 (discussing “‘Interest’ and ‘Interests’ as
Tamers of the Passions”).
50. SMITH, supra note 1, at 12.
51. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) (discussing the fragility of the informal markets in
which the poor of the developing world struggle).
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state as its expansion upsets the equilibrium of these relationships. Likewise,
in order to foster markets, the state may limit arbitrary and intrusive action
for purely instrumental reasons. Robust markets may thus serve to provide
part of the social background that can render the formal structure of rights
and constitutional protections effective.
The legal history of early Virginia provides an example of how this can
be so. The Virginia Company was set up as a profit-making enterprise.
Initially, it pursued a strategy of extracting as much labor as possible from
colonists through a military-style system of hierarchical command and
arbitrary rule.52 When this approach proved an economic failure, however,
the colony shifted to a less hierarchical, more rule-bound regime in order to
foster greater investment and commercial activity by providing legal
predictability.53 The result was a move toward a legal system more infused
with rule-of-law values, such as legal consistency and respect by the
government for the legal rights of its subjects.54 As William E. Nelson has
written:
Tyranny, liberty, and consent are the wrong concepts through
which to understand why the legal system of seventeenth-century
Virginia changed. Although some of the substantive law
changes . . . ultimately may have promoted liberty, there is no
evidence that such was their purpose. Profit and the accumulation
of wealth, not the attainment of liberty, were the highest
aspirations of seventeenth-century Virginians and of the
Englishmen who invested in Virginia. It was those aspirations and
the need to facilitate the investment that would foster them which
drove transformation of the colony’s law.55
To be sure, no one would hold up seventeenth-century Virginia as a liberal
society, particularly as African slavery became deeply entrenched in the
economy and legal system of the colony in the second half of the century.56
Nor am I claiming that markets alone are sufficient to push political
institutions toward liberal outcomes. Nevertheless, as the rise of rule-of-law
values in seventeenth-century Virginia shows, markets can be an important
factor limiting the reach of the state and creating incentives for government
officials to conform more closely to liberal ideals.

52. See 1 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE CHESAPEAKE
NEW ENGLAND, 1607–1660, at 13–22 (2008) (discussing the legal regime of the early
Jamestown settlement).
53. See id. at 23–47 (discussing the shift in the Virginia legal system after the revocation of
the original Virginia Company charter in 1619).
54. See id.
55. Id. at 23.
56. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE
NEW WORLD 131–35 (2006) (discussing the introduction of African slavery to Virginia).

AND
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B. WEALTH
Markets have proven the greatest engine for the creation of wealth in
the history of the world. For most of human history, the material condition
of mankind has not changed dramatically.57 While any attempt to measure
such things is necessarily fraught with difficulty, our best estimates indicate
that global GDP per person did not increase markedly from the time of the
Roman Republic to the defeat of the Spanish Armada.58 In the seventeenth
century, however, that began to change. Beginning in the Netherlands and
spreading first to England and then later to North America, the rest of
Europe, and finally portions of East Asia we began to see, for the first time,
sustained and exponential growth.59 The rate of growth in and of itself was
not dramatic—three to five percent per year—but adjusting out the peaks
and troughs it continued year in and year out for the next three centuries.
To give some sense of what this economic revolution meant, consider for a
moment the fact that in the year 1800 the average daily consumption of a
relatively prosperous American settler was roughly $3 per day in current
value.60 After two-hundred years of sustained growth that same figure had
multiplied some fifty times to roughly $150 per day for the average
American.61 The difference between an income of $3 per day and $150 per
day is the difference between the average citizen of Bangledesh and the
average citizen of the United States.62 The movement of some societies from
the first economic condition to the second economic condition is one of the
great events in human history.

57. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 16, at 2 (“Economic history has looked like an ice-hockey
stick lying on the ground. It had a long, long horizontal handle at $3 a day extending through
the two-hundred-thousand-year history of Homo sapiens to 1800, with little bumps upward on the
handle in ancient Rome and the early medieval Arab world and high medieval Europe, with
regressions to $3 afterward—then a wholly unexpected blade, leaping up in the last two out of
the two thousand centuries, to $30 a day and in many places well beyond.”).
58. See id.
59. See JOYCE APPLEBY, THE RELENTLESS REVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF CAPITALISM 7 (2010)
(“[Modern capitalism began] first in England and the Netherlands, next in Western Europe,
and then in the American colonies. Outside these areas, capitalism moved next to Eastern
Europe and Japan.”).
60. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 16, at 1 (“In 1800 the average human consumed and
expected her children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren to go on consuming a mere
$3 a day, give or take a dollar or two.”).
61. Id. at 2 (“In the now much richer countries, such as Norway, the average person earns
fully forty-five times more than in 1800, a startling $137 a day, or $120 for the average person
in the United States, or $90 in Japan.”).
62. Id. at 1 (“Two centuries ago the world’s economy stood at the present level of
Bangladesh.”).
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There is a huge and controversial literature on why this shift took
place.63 I don’t purport to have answers to the questions and debates these
discussions pose, so I will confine myself to a few observations. First,
sustained economic growth does not seem to have been the result of
expropriating the wealth of others. For example, some have posited that the
massive conquests of non-Western people that began after 1492 account for
the economic rise of the West.64 The problem with this theory is that the
timing and geography are wrong.65 Spanish conquistadors were ravaging the
New World for centuries before the economic big bang began in the
Netherlands, and often the actual economic consequences of their
conquests were negative or a wash at best.66 For example, the massive
importation of precious metals from the New World, far from permanently
enriching the Spanish economy, led to widespread inflation in Europe and
contributed to the ultimate fiscal collapse of the Spanish monarchy.67 We
must reject the story of wealth-via-expropriation as, at best, incomplete.68
Second, the economic explosion of the West cannot be explained in
terms of traditional efficiency analysis. Indeed, there is a striking historical
irony in the fact that as the intellectual foundations of equilibrium models
of economics were being developed by the classical economists in the early
nineteenth century, those same economists were remarkably pessimistic
about the economic prospects for their society.69 Neither Malthus, Ricardo,
63. See NATHAN ROSENBERG & L.E. BIRDZELL, JR., HOW THE WEST GREW RICH: THE
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD 9–19 (1986) (“The causes of the
West’s rise from poverty to wealth have been extensively explored for a century-and-a-half.”).
64. Id. at 16 (“Several explanations turn on the relations between Western countries and
other, economically less developed, countries. Marxists describe these relations as
imperialism . . . .”).
65. Id. at 18 (“[T]he primary reason for doubting that an adequate explanation for
Western growth is to be found in imperialism is the absence of any correlation between the
magnitude and timing of Western countries’ economic growth and the magnitude and timing
of their participation in imperialism.”).
66. See id. (“Imperialist Spain and Portugal did not achieve long-term growth . . . .”).
67. See APPLEBY, supra note 59, at 46 (“The flood of silver that the conquistadors stole
from the Incas and Aztecs precipitated a century-long inflation in Europe.”).
68. See ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 63, at 17–18 (“The eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury history of most imperialist countries makes their economic growth seem more a cause
of imperialism, stimulating overseas political adventures in the irresponsible exercise of newfound economic power, than its result.”).
69. Dierdre McCloskey makes the point, thus:
The economists, in other words, did not notice that something entirely new was
happening from 1760 or 1780 to 1860. As the demographer Anthony Wrigley put
it a while ago, “The classical economists were not merely unconscious of changes
going on about them that many now term an industrial revolution: they were in
effect committed to a view of the nature of economic development that ruled it out
as a possibility.” At the moment . . . that John Stuart Mill came to understand an
economy in equilibrium, the economy grew away from the equilibrium.
MCCLOSKEY, supra note 16, at 89 (footnote omitted).
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nor Mill seem to have been aware of the revolutionary economic
transformations through which they were living.70 They realized that
increased efficiency in the allocation of the factors of production would
result in only modest and marginal gains before settling into a static
equilibrium.71 Yet, this is precisely what their societies were not doing.
Instead, they were experiencing an explosion in economic growth far
beyond anything predicted by the equilibrium models of the classical
economists.72
Third, the process of market exchange itself was a factor in the
economic explosion of the West. One way of thinking about this is to look at
the process of entrepreneurship.73 Widespread markets created incentives
for people to experiment and innovate because they provided customers for
new products and services.74 Entrepreneurs, in turn, created entirely new
categories of goods and services in order to prosper in the market.75 It is not
simply that they found ways of delivering existing goods and services with
marginally greater efficiency. Rather, the process of entrepreneurship itself
was a mechanism by which entirely new and better ways of living in the world
were discovered.76 Thus, the telephone was not simply a more efficient
version of the telegraph, which itself was far more than simply a marginally
faster version of the letter. By providing a social space in which
entrepreneurship thrived, the rise of widespread markets facilitated this
discovery. Hence, while it is true that certain technological factors, such as
the harnessing of cheap fossil fuel energy in coal and then oil, contributed
to growth, markets were a key part of the social mechanism by which these
technological improvements were discovered and implemented.77
The value of wealth comes from two sources. The first is in the lessening
of material suffering. By virtually any measure of human misery, wealthy

70. See id. at 87 (noting the scorn of Joseph Schumpeter for Malthus, Ricardo, and, in
particular, Mill for failing to have any “idea of what the capitalist engine was going to achieve”
(quoting JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 571 (Elizabeth B.
Schumpeter ed., 1954))).
71. Id. at 92 (“To speak again to my economist colleagues, they [i.e., the classical
economists] all contemplated moving down the marginal product of capital—not its shocking,
factor-of-sixteen lurch to the right.”).
72. Id. at 86–87 (noting that nineteenth-century economists noted marginal increases in
productivity and economic growth, but “did not notice, however, that the change to be
explained, 1780–1860, was not 5 or 10 percent but 100 percent, and was on its way to that
unprecedented 1,500 percent conservatively measured relative to what it was in the eighteenth
century”).
73. See James M. Buchanan & Viktor J. Vanberg, The Market as a Creative Process, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 378, 378–98 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 3d ed.
2008).
74. See id. at 389–90.
75. See id. at 391.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 389.
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societies are kinder to their inhabitants than impoverished societies.78 This is
manifested in things such as lower infant mortality rates and greater leisure
time.79 Wealth, however, also has other benefits. For example, societies with
robust economic growth have lower levels of ethnic and religious conflict.80
Likewise, they tend to have better treatment for women and minorities.81
And so on. None of these things is logically related to wealth, let alone to
markets. It is possible for poor people to be healthy. It is possible for poor
societies to be peaceful and tolerant. Rather, my point is the more modest
claim that wealthier societies are strongly correlated with a host of measures
of well-being that should sway even those who are unimpressed by the crude
piling up of personal fortunes.82
C. VIRTUE
Finally, markets can be justified as inculcators of certain personal
virtues. Different activities are conducive to different virtues. Consider an
extreme example: war. There is a long tradition of romanticizing warfare, a
tradition that has led to more than its fair share of violence and human
suffering. Nevertheless, conflict has a way of bringing out certain virtues,
such as courage, self-sacrifice, fraternity, and self-discipline. The romantic
portrayals of war are aesthetically powerful precisely because they appeal to
these virtues. Much of the emotional appeal of war—and despite our
appropriate horror of war, there is no denying it has had a very strong
emotional appeal through the centuries—lies in the belief that it provides a
forum in which these virtues are inculcated and demonstrated. While few
poets have been tempted to write epics about the marketplace, the market,
like war, inculcates its own set of virtues.

78. See BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 12
(2005) (“Greater affluence means, among many other things, better food, bigger houses, more
travel, and improved medical care. It means that more people can afford a better education. It
may also mean, as it did in most Western countries during the twentieth century, a shorter
workweek, which allows more time for family and friends. Moreover, these material benefits of
rising incomes accrue not just to individuals and their families but to communities and even
entire countries. Greater affluence can also mean better schools, more parks and museums, and
larger concert halls and sports arenas, not to mention more leisure to enjoy these public
facilities. A rising average income allows a country to project its national interest abroad, or
send a man to the moon.”).
79. Id. at 3 (noting that economic growth results in “greater life expectancy, fewer
diseases, less infant mortality and malnutrition”).
80. Id. at 80 (“What matters is how rising incomes shape the perspective and attitudes of
those who earn them, and their families, and how the resulting impact on enough individuals’
attitudes in turn brings about change in a country’s political institutions and social dynamics.”).
81. Id. at 79–80 (“It is not hard to see that a strong economy, where opportunities are
plentiful and jobs go begging, helps break down social barriers. Bigoted employers may still
dislike hiring members of one group or another, but when nobody else is available
discrimination most often gives way to the sheer need to get the work done.”).
82. Id. at 12.
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We can think of war as inculcating certain virtues because success in
violent conflict requires a certain set of characteristics. A successful soldier
must be brave and disciplined.83 It is the context in which the soldier’s
actions occur that requires these virtues. Like war, market activity has a
paradigmatic case, but rather than violent conflict, it is the process of
exchange. Successful exchange requires that we constantly place our needs
and desires in the context of another person’s needs and desires. In order to
get what we want, we must in some way see to it that the other party gets
what he wants. To be sure, this is not an altruistic concern, but it is a kind of
concern for the other.
Smith is perhaps the best candidate for a poet of the market. Although
most often cast as the founding father of rational-choice economics, Smith
spent his life as a moral philosopher.84 While he was not necessarily a virtue
theorist, he was deeply influenced by classical thinkers who emphasized the
importance of virtue and character and was tremendously concerned with
moral sentiments—what we might think of as the emotional habits of moral
life.85 He saw in commerce a system that tended to systematically punish
predation against others and reward peaceful and diligent action.86
In this, he mirrored many eighteenth-century theorists, such as
Montesquieu, who lauded the effect of commerce upon manners. In Book
Twenty of the Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu provides an extended
discussion of the moral impact of commerce on individuals and society.
“Commerce,” he wrote, “cures destructive prejudices, and it is an almost
general rule that everywhere there are gentle mores, there is commerce and
that everywhere there is commerce, there are gentle mores.”87 In contrast to
monarchial or aristocratic regimes, with their emphasis on honor, power,
and conquest, commercial society tends to make men tolerant and peaceful.
This is Montesquieu’s famous doux commerce argument. This does not mean,
of course, that Montesquieu was indifferent to the moral dangers of
commercial society, which he saw as very much a two-edged sword.
“Commerce corrupts pure mores, and this was the subject of Plato’s
complaints,” he wrote. “[I]t polishes and softens barbarous mores, as we see
every day.”88 Likewise, he deplored the tendency of commercial society to
reduce every human activity to monetary exchange:

83. See, e.g., PLATO, Laches, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 123 (Edith Hamilton
& Huntington Cairns eds., 1961) (c. 380 B.C.E) (discussing the nature of courage).
84. See NICHOLAS PHILLIPSON, ADAM SMITH: AN ENLIGHTENED LIFE 120–38, 159–79
(2010) (discussing Adam Smith’s career as a moral philosopher).
85. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie
eds., 1976) (1759); see also PHILLIPSON, supra note 84, at 138–58 (discussing “The Theory of
Moral Sentiments and the Civilizing Powers of Commerce”).
86. See SMITH, supra note 1; SMITH, supra note 85.
87. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 41, at 338 (footnote omitted).
88. Id. (footnote omitted).
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[I]f the spirit of commerce unites nations, it does not unite
individuals in the same way. We see that in countries where one is
affected only by the spirit of commerce, there is traffic in all human
activities and all moral virtues; the smallest things, those required
by humanity, are done or given for money.89
For Montesquieu, commerce presented a threat to the highest ideals that
one might imagine, but tended to have a beneficial effect on humanity as
one actually encountered it.
There is empirical evidence in support of Montesquieu’s thesis.
Experimental studies show that market activity is strongly correlated with
higher levels of interpersonal trust.90 Variations on the prisoner’s dilemma
allow us to measure the strength of individual commitment to trust and
reciprocity.91 For example, in the so-called ultimatum game there are two
players. The experimenters give the first player a sum of money.92 That
player then divides the money between himself and the second player.93 The
second player then chooses whether to accept the division, in which case
each player keeps the amount allocated by the first player.94 If the second
player chooses to refuse the offer, then both players get nothing.95 A simple
wealth-maximizing model of human behavior suggests that the first player
should offer as little as possible to the second player, and the second player
should accept.96 This result is almost never observed. The amount of money
offered by the first player and the threshold below which the second player
refuses, however, vary greatly from culture to culture.97 The simple formal
structure of the game allows for cross-cultural comparisons, which reveal
that there is an inverse relationship between suspicion and market
penetration.98 The more important commerce is for a society, the higher the
levels of observed trust and reciprocity in the ultimatum game.99 Societies
with little market activity—such as those based on subsistence agriculture or

89. Id. at 338–39 (footnote omitted).
90. See Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15
Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73, 73–78 (2001) (summarizing experiments with the
ultimatum game carried out in several different cultural contexts); Joseph Henrich et al.,
“Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspsective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 795, 795–855 (2005) [hereinafter Henrich et al., “Economic Man”]
(providing a more extensive discussion of the same experiments).
91. See Henrich et al., “Economic Man,” supra note 90, at 803.
92. See id. at 798.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 804.
98. See id. at 809.
99. See id. at 808.
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animal husbandry—show the lowest levels of trust and reciprocity.100 Of
course, it is difficult to tell which way causation flows from these results.
Markets could be causing trust or trust could be causing markets to flourish.
Regardless, we have good reasons to facilitate market transactions, either to
jump start markets and thereby foster activity that will in turn foster trust, or
alternatively, fostering markets may act as a multiplier for pre-existing trust,
extending its reach and hold over peoples’ attitudes.
IV. MARKETS AND CONTRACT LAW
Contract law supports markets. This does not mean that markets and
contract law are co-extensive. Markets may not be natural, but they do not
require law in order to exist. Thriving informal and even illegal markets
testify to this fact. Furthermore, throughout human history international
trade has thrived even in circumstances in which it was difficult, if not
impossible, to get the state to enforce one’s agreements. Contract law,
however, can strengthen and deepen markets. By limiting opportunism,
lowering transaction costs, inculcating moral attitudes conducive to market
exchange, and the like, contract law makes widespread exchange between
strangers easier and more likely.
While contracts and markets are intimately intertwined, one of the
striking features of most moral theories of contract law is their relative
indifference to markets. The contemporary moral or philosophical literature
on contract law is dominated by promissory theories of contract.101 Broadly
speaking, all of these theories look at contracts as examples of promises and
understand the basis of contractual obligation to be related in some
fundamental way to the moral obligation to keep a promise.102 There is, of
course, no necessary relationship between promissory morality and the
market. We make promises all the time that have little or no relationship to
commercial activity. Hence, one can develop an elaborate and complete
theory of promising without saying much of anything at all about markets.
Likewise, one can develop a promissory theory of contract law without saying
much of anything about markets. This is largely what promissory theorists of
contract have done. They have had much to say about the duty to keep a
promise and the structure of contractual obligation.103 Their arguments,
however, have been largely oblivious to the fact that—along with private
property—contract is the central legal institution of a market economy.
I don’t mean by this that promissory theorists are ignorant of the
obvious fact that most contracts involve commercial activity or that they have
ignored this fact in their theories. I do believe, however, that the

100.
101.
102.
103.

See id. at 810.
See SMITH, supra note 19, at 56.
See id. at 13, 57–58.
See generally SMITH, supra note 19.
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relationship between contract law and markets has been taken as accidental,
and that the value of markets—as opposed to promise keeping—has played
little or no role in their arguments. In this section, I hope to show that this
approach is a mistake and that focusing on the moral value of markets, as
opposed to the moral value of promising, provides a better way of dealing
with three basic problems with which any theory of contract law must deal.
The first such question is why the law should concern itself with enforcing
promises at all. Not all moral obligations are legally enforced. Why should
promises be singled out for legal attention? The second is differentiating
between those voluntary commitments that are legally enforced and those
that are not. Even if promises should be legally enforced, not all promises
are enforced. Why pick some promises for enforcement but not others? The
third is the limited availability of specific performance, the remedy that
would actually enforce contracts. If we believe that contract law should
enforce promissory morality, then the wide availability of money damages
seems perverse or, at best, a kind of second-best compromise.
A. PROMISSORY THEORIES OF CONTRACT
Section 1 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that “[a]
contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes
as a duty.”104 While some scholars have expressed skepticism as to whether
contracts are in fact promises, most judges, practitioners, and scholars
accept that a contract consists of a legally enforceable promise.105 It does not
follow from this, however, that most judges, practitioners, and scholars
subscribe to a promissory theory of contract law. In other words, one may
believe that contracts are made—in part—by making promises without
thinking that the moral force of promising provides the normative
justification for contract law. For example, law and economics scholars
routinely refer to “promisors” and “promisees” in their work, even as they
explicitly argue that economic efficiency justifies contract law.106 Likewise,
partisans of reliance-based justifications for contract law, such as Grant
Gilmore and Patrick Atiyah, speak of promises made and contracts formed,
even though they do not normatively ground contract law in promissory
morality.107
Charles Fried offered the most unambiguous modern defense of a
promissory theory of contract thirty years ago in his book Contract as
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
105. See generally Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269
(1986); Michael G. Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 801 (2008).
106. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 35, at 115–82 (8th ed. 2011) (summarizing economic
theories of how contract law creates optimal economic incentives for promisors and promisees).
107. See P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF
CONTRACT (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 1995).
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Promise.108 For Fried, the relationship between contract and promise is
simple and straightforward. When people make promises, they incur a moral
obligation to keep those promises.109 When they fail to live up to these
obligations and breach their promises, they treat others with disrespect.110
Contract is simply the legal reflection of this moral structure. The legal
obligations of contract correspond to the moral obligations to keep a
promise, and the doctrinal structure of contract is simply the institutional
instantiation of the moral structure of promise keeping.111 Since its
publication a generation ago, Fried’s theory has attracted few disciples but
has generated an enormous amount of discussion.112 Out of this discussion
have come alternative formulations of the promissory approach to contract
law.
Consider the work of Seana Shiffrin.113 Unlike Fried, Shiffrin’s theory of
contract is not reflective. She does not explicitly claim that contract law does
or should reflect some underlying structure of promissory morality. Rather,
she offers promissory morality as a kind of limiting principle on legitimate
legal and political institutions. The law, she argues, should not encourage its
citizens to behave in immoral ways, nor should it undermine a commitment
to valuable moral practices.114 Shiffrin accepts that we have a moral
obligation to keep our promises.115 She also believes that contract law
invokes the practice of promising. As discussed in a moment, however,
Shiffrin’s argument is primarily critical. She believes that contract law as it
currently exists fails to comply with her theory of morality as a limiting
principle.

108. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
(1981).
109. See id. at 13 (“In order that I be as free as possible, that my will have the greatest
possible range consistent with the similar will of others, it is necessary that there be a way in
which I may commit myself. It is necessary that I be able to make nonoptional a course of
conduct that would otherwise be optional for me.”).
110. See id. at 16 (“To renege is to abuse a confidence he was free to invite or not, and
which he intentionally did invite. To abuse that confidence now is like (but only like) lying: the
abuse of a shared social institution that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust.”).
111. See id. at 1 (“The promise principle, which in this book I argue is the moral basis of
contract law, is that principle by which persons may impose on themselves obligations where
none existed before.”).
112. The thirtieth anniversary of the publication of Fried’s book was marked by a
symposium on the work and its influence. The articles produced by the symposium provide a
flavor for the sorts of discussions that have been sparked by Fried’s book. See generally
Symposium, Contract as Promise at 30: The Future of Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 601
(2012).
113. See Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551 (2009)
[hereinafter Shiffrin, Immoral?]; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise,
120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Divergence].
114. See Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 113, at 710.
115. See id. at 749.
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B. WHY ENFORCE MORAL OBLIGATIONS?
The first problem that confronts a promissory theory of contract is the
question of why the law should seek to enforce moral obligations at all. This
objection can take a strong form or a weak form. The strong form rests on
the distinction within liberal philosophy between the right and the good.
According to this view, liberal societies must begin with the brute fact of
moral pluralism, the absence of widespread agreement about final goods
and moral virtue. Accordingly, the law should remain neutral on such
matters, allowing each citizen to decide for him or herself questions of
personal morality and pursue his or her own vision of the good. The law
should confine itself to protecting individual rights, a domain of justice that
is conceptually independent of notions of the good. According to the strong
objection, promissory morality is a matter of personal virtue and cannot be a
legitimate legal concern.116 This does not mean, of course, that contract law
is necessarily illegitimate, only that it cannot be legitimately defended as
enforcing the moral obligation to keep a promise.117
In its weaker form, this objection needn’t invoke a stark liberal divide
between the right and the good. Rather than claiming that there is some
clearly defined realm of moral demands—the good—that cannot
legitimately be the subject of legal rules, one might simply acknowledge that
not all moral obligations are legal obligations. This is true even in legal
systems that have no liberal scruples about enforcing morality. For example,
under classical Islamic law there is no sharp distinction between law and
morality, or religion and the state, and there is certainly no objection to
coercing moral behavior per se. “You are the best nation ever brought forth
to men, bidding to honour, and forbidding dishonour, and believing in
God.”118 Even so, Islamic legal theorists have a five-fold categorization of
actions: those that are forbidden, those that are discouraged, those that are
indifferent, those that are encouraged, and those that are required.119
Hence, even in the view of the classical Sharia there are moral obligations
that are not also coerced, legal obligations. So long as one does not believe
that all moral obligations should become legal obligations—and I am
unaware of any legal system that that has ever made such a claim—one must
at least explain why promissory moral obligations should also be legal
obligations. Merely demonstrating that there is a moral duty to keep a
promise does not demonstrate that there should be a corresponding legal
116. See Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1022,
1025 (1992).
117. See id. at 1024.
118. 1 THE KORAN INTERPRETED 87 (A.J. Arberry trans., Touchstone 1996) (1955).
119. See, e.g., PETE SEDA, ISLAM IS . . . : AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM & ITS PRINCIPLES 45
(2002) (providing a popular introduction to Islam). See generally Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic
Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 27 (2002) (providing a
concise summary of Islamic law).
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obligation, even if one does not subscribe to a sharp distinction between the
right and the good.
To be sure, some promissory theorists seek to answer this question.
Fried’s response is to locate the obligation to keep a promise in the moral
realm of the right rather than the good.120 His argument is that promise
breaking is a breach of trust, an abuse of another person.121 It is not clear,
however, that this claim stands up to closer scrutiny. First, there are other
abuses of trust that are not legally prohibited, even though they are often
more wrenching than a breach of contract. Consider, for example, the
person who discovers that their significant other has been cheating. While
such action might be a ground for divorce—and thus legal action—in the
case of a married couple, among unmarried couples there may be no legal
wrong at all. Second, not all broken promises involve a breach of a trust.
Consider the habitual promise breaker whose commitments are never
trusted. It would be odd to say that such a person breaches no moral
obligation when, as expected, he breaks his promise. This suggests, however,
that the wrong of promise breaking is not necessarily an abuse of trust.
Shiffrin likewise seeks to answer this objection. Unlike Fried, her
promissory theory of contract is not reflective.122 As a formal matter, she
does not insist that the legal obligations of contract must correspond to the
moral obligations of promise.123 However, in her hands, the side constraint
of morality should have a considerable influence on the law of contracts.
Because in her view the law cannot encourage its citizens to engage in
immoral behavior or undermine moral practices, in practice, she argues that
the law of contracts must mirror the morality of promising quite closely.124
So long as the law of contracts enforces promises, it must do so in a way that
coheres strongly with promissory morality.125 There is, however, something
unsatisfying about this formulation, as it does not seek to explain why one
would wish to have a law of contracts at all.
If one accepts the social desirability of markets, then the question of
why we enforce certain promises becomes much easier. On this view,
contract law exists in large part to support markets. We enforce promises not
because promissory morality is somehow uniquely deserving of legal
enforcement. Rather, we legally enforce promises because doing so sustains

120.
121.
122.
709.
123.
709.
124.
710–12.
125.
717.

See supra note 109.
See id. at 16.
See Shiffrin, Immoral?, supra note 113, at 1557; Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 113, at
See Shiffrin, Immoral?, supra note 113, at 1556; Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 113, at
See Shiffrin, Immoral?, supra note 113, at 1568; Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 113, at
See Shiffrin, Immoral?, supra note 113, at 1557; Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 113, at
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markets. Our goal is not the maintenance of promissory morality, but the
maintenance of markets. Providing legal enforcement of promises does this
in at least two ways.
First, it deals with the problem of ex post opportunism. In a world of
simultaneous exchange, quid is exchanged for pro and there is no need for
the enforcement of contracts. When transactions are extended over time,
however, there is always the danger that once A has conferred a benefit on B
that B will renege and pocket the benefit.126 Thomas Hobbes summarized
the problem:
For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will
performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle
mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the
feare of some coërcive Power; which in the condition of meer
Nature, where all men are equall, and judges of the justnesse of
their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed.127
As discussed below, Hobbes was too pessimistic about the possibility of
exchange in the absence of law.128 On the other hand, by empowering
disappointed promisees to take action against breaching promisors, the law
of contract surely limits the amount of opportunism that we would otherwise
expect to observe.129 More importantly, the availability of formal recourse in
the event of breach gives market participants the confidence to engage in
transactions that they would otherwise forgo out of fear of exploitation.130
Second, the formal enforcement of promises helps to sustain the
mutual trust between trading parties that makes formal enforcement itself of
secondary importance. To understand what this means, consider an
example from Herodotus. He tells of how Carthaginian traders first
ventured out of the Mediterranean, beyond the Pillars of Hercules (the
Straits of Gibraltar) and into the rougher seas of the Atlantic.131 Crawling
down the coast of Africa, they came to a fertile land, and there engaged in a
strange ritual.132 Going ashore, they would lay their cargo of olive oil and
bronze tools on the beach.133 Then they would retreat to their ships, float off

126. See Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of Contractual Liability,
96 IOWA L. REV. 529, 546 (2011).
127. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 96 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1651).
128. See Oman, supra note 126, at 545.
129. See id. at 551.
130. See id. at 560–63.
131. See HERODOTUS, THE HISTORIES bk. 4, ch. 42, at 318–19 (George Rawlinson trans.,
Everyman’s Library 1997) (c. 426 B.C.E.) (discussing the expedition of Phoenicians sent to
circumnavigate Africa by the Egyptian King Neco).
132. See id. at bk. 4, ch. 196, at 381–82 (discussing trading practices by Carthaginians—a
Phoenecian group—on the coasts of “Libya,” a region on the Atlantic coast of Africa).
133. See id.
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shore, and send up smoke signals.134 A short time later, hoards of people
would emerge from the forest, examine the goods left by the Carthaginians,
and then lay their own piles of gold on the beach.135 Done, these people
would then retreat back into the forest.136 Once they were gone, the
Carthaginians would return to the shore.137 If they thought the offered ivory
and gold constituted a fair trade, they would leave their goods and take the
African commodities aboard their ship.138 If they thought the offer too low,
they would return to their ships with nothing.139 The people would then
emerge from the woods and either take back their gold without touching
the Carthaginian goods or else would increase the size of their offering until
it was accepted by the traders from the sea.140 The entire process, according
to Herodotus, took place without either side speaking to the other or even
knowing their language.141
Herodotus’s story illustrates that the problem of ex post opportunism
can be overcome in some circumstances even without the assistance of
formal legal mechanisms.142 Humanity’s inclination to “truck and barter,” it
would seem, wins out over its instincts for predation. This process, however,
requires high levels of mutual trust, and we have numerous examples of
societies where such trust is absent.143 Furthermore, to the extent that such
mutual trust and forbearance among those of sharply differing viewpoints is
one of the reasons we regard markets as desirable, then it would seem that
we face a vicious circle. As Jules Coleman has observed:
Under precisely those circumstances where markets are most
desirable from the point of view of social stability, they are most
difficult to create and sustain, whereas in those circumstances most
conducive to low-cost market interaction, because of their
impersonality, markets may well be less desirable forms of social
organization.144

134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 382 (“Neither party deals unfairly by the other: for they themselves never
touch the gold till it comes up to the worth of their goods, nor do the natives ever carry off the
goods till the gold is taken away.”).
143. See ROBERT H. BATES, PROSPERITY AND VIOLENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
DEVELOPMENT 43–45 (2001) (discussing the breakdown of trust and cooperation among the
Neur tribes of East Africa).
144. COLEMAN, supra note 44, at 69.
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According to Coleman, “the solution is to develop bodies of law that provide
resources capable of reducing uncertainty and fostering market
cooperation.”145 Contract does this, according to Coleman, by reducing the
risk of ex post defection.146 As noted above, I have no quarrel with this claim,
but I think it is incomplete.
Law can also serve an important didactic function, indicating those
actions that society regards as laudable and those that it regards as
blameworthy. Such collective norm creation has an effect on behavior, as
people seek to conform to collectively approved standards of behavior. Of
course, the moral suasion of the law is hardly all-powerful or always justified.
The mere fact that some legal sanction is attached to an action does not
mean that people will refrain from doing the action, nor does the existence
of a legal duty without more command universal respect. Nevertheless, our
legal system depends on massive levels of voluntary compliance, compliance
that is largely forthcoming from the public when the laws are regarded as
legitimate. Hence, if we accept even a weak version of the law’s didactic
power, then giving legal sanction to cooperative behavior via contract law
will tend to foster norms of mutual performance. Put bluntly, people fail to
renege on their agreements not simply because they fear formal legal
sanctions, but because they wish to comply with the social norms of good
behavior the law of contracts expresses. This law-fostered voluntary
compliance, in turn, helps to underwrite the trust on which markets depend.
It also provides an expressive reason for enforcing market promises.
There is a variation on this argument based on the power of habit.
Those things that we repeatedly do, regardless of our initial reasons, tend to
become habitual. Of course, the fact that something is a habit does not
mean that we always do it or cannot refrain from doing should we choose.
That which is habitual, however, gets done with greater frequency than that
which is not habitual. Through formal coercion and social suasion, the law
of contracts encourages people to keep their commitments. As they
repeatedly do so, however, commitment keeping becomes a habit.
Furthermore, there is a self-reinforcing mechanism with habits. Habitual
promise keepers are more likely to follow the dictates of the law of contracts,
which reinforces its effectiveness and perceived legitimacy. The law of
contracts, then, reinforces the habit of commitment keeping.
C. NOT ALL PROMISES ARE ENFORCED AS CONTRACTS
As the late E. Allan Farnsworth observed, “No legal system has ever been
reckless enough to make all promises enforceable.”147 Any legal system will
necessarily pick and choose among the promises that it will recognize as

145.
146.
147.

Id.
See id. at 11920.
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 12 (2d ed. 1990).
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legally binding contracts. This necessity, however, presents a problem for
promissory theories. If the law is supposed to reflect moral obligations, why
does it do so only incompletely? Why do we have some promises that are
clearly morally binding but which are not recognized as legally binding
contracts?
Fried’s discussion of the doctrine of consideration illustrates the
problem. In effect, Fried tries to solve this problem by declaring that it
doesn’t exist.148 Rather than grapple with the truism articulated by
Farnsworth, he argues that the doctrine of consideration does not actually
exist. The cases, he insists, are too shot through with inconsistency and
circular arguments to serve as a criterion for anything.149 In effect, he claims
that the common law has no answer to the question of which promises the
law should enforce.150 Fried offers this argument as a defense of his
promissory theory, and it is easy to see why he would find such a position
attractive. It makes it easier to claim that the law reflects the moral
obligation to keep a promise. This, however, will not do. Fried is rather too
hard on the doctrine of consideration. It is not clear that it is more prone to
ambiguity and difficulty than the other doctrines that Fried defends.
Furthermore, while it presents a number of difficult marginal cases—as does
any doctrine—it offers a fairly straightforward claim: legally enforceable
contracts consist of promises made in exchange for something.151 In the
end, Fried’s hostility rests less on the internal problems of the consideration
doctrine than on his commitment to justifying contractual liability purely on
the basis of promissory morality.
Shiffrin does not directly address the question of which promises the
law should enforce. On the other hand, she is highly critical of the common
law’s preference for money damages over specific performance.152 This rule,
she argues, encourages people to treat their commitments as options, a view
that she sees as incompatible with the moral obligation to keep a promise.153
Elsewhere, she goes so far as to argue that the moral wrong involved in
breaching a contract is so serious that it should give rise to a claim for

148. See FRIED, supra note 108, at 38 (“My conclusion is rather that the doctrine of
consideration offers no coherent alternative basis for the force of contracts, while still treating
promise as necessary to it.”).
149. See id. (“I conclude that the standard doctrine of consideration, which is illustrated by
the preceding ten quite typical common law cases, does not pose a challenge to my conception
of contract law as rooted in promise, for the simple reason that that doctrine is too internally
inconsistent to offer an alternative at all.”).
150. See id. at 3738 (“I conclude that the life of contract is indeed promise, but this
conclusion is not exactly a statement of positive law. There are too many gaps in the common
law enforcement of promises to permit so bold a statement.”).
151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) (setting forth the bargain
theory of consideration).
152. See Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 113, at 723.
153. See id. at 731.

A4_OMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

MARKETS AS A MORAL FOUNDATION

10/1/2012 10:55 AM

213

punitive damages on breach claims, damages that cannot be justified based
on breach not being “morally wrong.”154 If the law’s refusal to enforce
contracts with a decree of specific performance threatens to undermine the
moral practice of promising by treating its obligations with insufficient
respect, however, then picking and choosing among promises would also
seem to be problematic. In effect, the law declares its indifference to the
breach of the kinds of moral obligations that it has elsewhere declared to be
worthy of legal recognition. Shiffrin’s theory is not reflective, so it doesn’t
require that the law mirror moral obligations. It is, however, deeply
concerned about the ability of the law to distort moral practices by using
them in ways inconsistent with their underlying moral structure. Thus,
without some justifying principle, it seems problematic for the law to enforce
only some promises.
If we focus our attention on markets rather than promissory morality,
however, there is a ready answer to the challenge. On this view, contract law
exists to facilitate markets rather than enforce moral obligations per se.
Hence, when asking, “What promises should the law enforce?,” the answer
is: “The law should enforce promises when doing so facilitates markets.” On
the other hand, when the enforcement of a promise would merely vindicate
one’s moral obligation to keep a commitment, unrelated to the market, we
have less of a reason to enforce the promise. There is nothing about a
market theory of contracts, of course, that precludes the law from
recognizing promises unrelated to market activity. However, once one sees
contract law as existing primarily to facilitate markets, these become
marginal cases requiring special justification.
This approach suggests that the law of contract formation should be
structured so as to pick out those promises whose enforcement facilitates
market activity. As a first-order approximation, this is what the bargain
theory of consideration seeks to do. According to the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, “to constitute consideration, a performance or a return
promise must be bargained for” and “a performance or return promise is
bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and
is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.”155 In this doctrinal
formulation, promises become legally enforceable contracts when there is
consideration, and consideration requires that the promise is made in
exchange for something else. In short, not all promises are enforced.
Rather, only those promises that are part of an exchange are contracts.
Exchange, of course, forms the basis for market transactions. Contract law, it
would seem, is structured so as to pick out market transactions and, in effect,
subsidize them by providing enforcement. Because they are not part of the

154.
155.

See Shiffrin, Immoral?, supra note 113, at 1551–52.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).

A4_OMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

214

10/1/2012 10:55 AM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:183

market, however, nonexchange promises are not treated as contracts
precisely because the purpose of contract law is to sustain markets.
It is useful to distinguish this defense of the doctrine of consideration
from others that have been offered for it. Lon Fuller, for example, saw
consideration as essentially a formal requirement, one that serves the
functions of other formalities such as the seal requirement in the action of
covenant.156 On this view, consideration serves evidentiary, cautionary, and
channeling functions.157 The underlying assumption is that contract law
should enforce commitments that are seriously entered into and provide a
way of clearly delineating the scope of contractual promises.158 This is what
the consideration doctrine does. Andrew Gold has offered a less pragmatic
defense of the consideration doctrine.159 According to Gold,
consideration—rather than serving the practical functions Fuller assigned to
it—picks out obligations that are, as a matter of political morality, deserving
of legal protection in and of themselves.160 According to Gold’s transfer
theory, a contract creates a kind of property interest by the promisee in the
promisor’s performance.161 This property interest arises because the
exchange relationship marks out the Lockean conditions under which one
may acquire a right to something other than one’s own person.162
Whatever the merits of these theories, they are quite different than the
market defense offered by this Article. My claim is not that bargained for
promises should be enforced because their bargained for nature gives us
assurance of their existence and the seriousness with which they were made.
Nor am I claiming that the expectations of performance acquired in a
bargained for promise are in themselves as a matter of substantive morality
deserving of legal recognition in a way that expectations based on gratuitous
promises are not. Rather, my claim is that bargained for promises are part of
market transactions, and it is this fact that justifies their enforcement. We
enforce them because doing so facilitates markets. Our law is uncomfortable
enforcing wholly gratuitous promises because their enforcement has
nothing to do with markets.163

156. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799 (1941).
157. Id. at 799801.
158. See id. at 80001.
159. See Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
160. See id. at 44.
161. See id. at 5.
162. See id. at 5 & nn.17–18.
163. Hence the ambivalent attitude of the common law of contracts toward gratuitous gift
promises. Compare Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898) (enforcing a gift promise
under the doctrine of promissory estoppel), with Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845) (refusing
to enforce a gratuitous promise to convey a piece of land to a relative). See also Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1997) (discussing
the common law’s hostility to enforcing gift promises).

A4_OMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/1/2012 10:55 AM

MARKETS AS A MORAL FOUNDATION

215

There are, of course, well-known objections to the doctrine of
consideration, objections that can be couched in terms of the market
arguments made here. For example, the doctrine of bargained for
consideration creates difficulties in cases of contract modification.164 Hence,
if midway through the performance of a contract the parties encounter an
unanticipated problem, it is difficult to create a legally binding modification.
The pre-existing duty rule will vitiate many modifications because they will
not involve any new bargain.165 A market-focused view of contract would
counsel in favor of allowing such modifications when doing so facilitates
market transactions, even if there is no formal bargain. This is because the
virtue of the bargain theory lies in the way in which it picks out market
transactions, not in any inherent and exclusive value in bargains per se. Not
all market transactions, however, are bargains for some new value. Hence,
for example, the Uniform Commercial Code’s rule abolishing the
consideration requirement for modification of sales contracts makes perfect
sense.166 These are market transactions, and in the absence of fraud or other
problems, modifications should be enforced even if there is no new bargain.
D. CONTRACT LAW REMEDIES DON’T ALWAYS ENFORCE PROMISES
The final problem is that, at least in the common law of contracts, the
main remedy for breach of contract is not the enforcement of the promise.
This claim is true in two senses. First, the law of contracts does not “enforce”
contracts in the sense of requiring a breaching party to perform via an order
of specific performance.167 Rather, the dominant remedy under the
common law is the award of money damages.168 Second, the law of contracts
does not “enforce” contracts in the sense of insuring that breaches of
contract are sanctioned by the state.169 Rather, contract law is a species of
private law, which means that rather than enforcing primary obligations it
empowers wronged parties to act against those that have breached their
obligations.170 If a potential plaintiff chooses not to sue, however, the law

164. See, e.g., Stilk v. Myrick, (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (C.P.); Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v.
Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1981) (“Performance of a legal duty
owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not
consideration . . . .”); see also id. at illus. 4.
166. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1990) (“An agreement modifying a contract within this Article
needs no consideration to be binding.”).
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (“Specific performance or an
injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interest
of the injured party.”).
168. See id. § 346(1) (“The injured party has a right to damages . . . .”).
169. See Oman, supra note 126, at 532–34
170. See Nathan B. Oman, Why There Is No Duty To Pay Damages: Powers, Duties, and Private
Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 137 (2011).
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does nothing to “enforce” the promissory obligation inherent in the
contract.171
Fried has claimed that the link between what he calls the promise
principle and expectation damages is “palpable.”172 The appeal to the selfevidence of money damages, however, falls flat for a number of reasons.173
First, in some circumstances, the common law will award specific
performance rather than money damages, and in most civil law countries,
specific performance is the default remedy. Why isn’t this remedy’s
connection with the promise principle more “palpable”? Second, it is
unclear why the moral obligation to keep a promise requires remedies in the
event of breach. Why not punish promise breakers in the same way that we
punish thieves? It is unclear why the moral obligation to keep a promise
commits us to some remedial scheme rather than punishment or some
other response.
Other promissory theorists have struggled with the issue of remedies.
Shiffrin has been the harshest recent critic of money damages for breach of
contract.174 She takes particular aim at the theory of efficient breach, which
sees contract law as a licensing breach so long as the breaching party is
willing to pay damages.175 Such an approach is unacceptable, she argues, for
at least two reasons. First, it encourages citizens to behave in morally
reprehensible ways, breaking their promises without a good excuse.176
Second, by encouraging such flouting of promissory obligations, it
undermines the practice of promising itself.177 Accordingly, Shiffrin argues
that the law should switch the default remedy to specific performance or,
perhaps, should sanction deliberate breach of contract with punitive
damages.178
To be sure, there have been sophisticated attempts to reconcile the
award of money damages with promissory theories of contract. One
possibility is that all contracts happen to be disjunctive promises to either
perform or pay damages.179 This is the approach suggested by some
economic theorists, who insist that in a fully specified contract this is
precisely what the parties would have explicitly agreed to.180 Fried has

171. See Oman, supra note 126, at 560.
172. See FRIED, supra note 108, at 21.
173. For a fuller critique of Fried’s arguments on this point, see Nathan B. Oman, Promise
and Private Law, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 935 (2012).
174. See Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 113, at 722–24.
175. See id. at 730.
176. See id. at 731–32.
177. See id. at 732–33.
178. See id. at 734; see also Shiffrin, Immoral?, supra note 113, at 1551–52.
179. See Steven Shavell, Essay, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439, 457 (2006).
180. See id.
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recently indicated that he holds to something like this view.181 This
argument faces two problems. First, it rests on a contingent and debatable
claim about the content of contractual promises.182 Second, it is inconsistent
with the pleading requirements and doctrinal structure of the common law
of contracts, which does not acknowledge the payment of damages as a
substitute for performance.183 Instead, damages, rather than forming part of
the obligations of a contract, are conceptualized as a remedy in the face of
the breach of those obligations. Jody Kraus has accepted this point and
argued that it is possible to specify—as a matter of promissory morality—not
only one’s obligations under a promise but also one’s remedial obligations
in the event of the failure to keep those obligations.184 This, however,
remains a highly controversial claim about the nature of promissory
morality. It is certainly plausible to suppose that while promissory morality
gives agents control over the content of their primary moral obligations
flowing from a promise, it does not give agents power over the moral
consequences of their own immoral behavior in breaking a promise.
The persistence of money damages presents a theoretical difficulty
because the assumption of promissory theories is that contract law exists to
vindicate promissory obligations. On the other hand, if we see contract law
as existing to facilitate markets, then this difficulty disappears. Even if we
accept the Restatement’s formulation of contracts as “a promise or a set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance
of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty,”185 it doesn’t follow that
contract law is joined at the hip to promissory morality. Rather, contact law
invokes promising not for its own sake but because by attending to promises
it can facilitate markets. On this view, promises are instrumentally, rather
than inherently, valuable. They are recognized and enforced only in so far as
that recognition and enforcement facilitates markets.
While markets are not natural, they do not depend on law for their
existence. Thriving markets in illegal commodities such as drugs, sex, and
pirated Hello Kitty bags demonstrate this fact. Contract law and other
market-sustaining legal regimes do not create markets. Rather, they
strengthen pre-existing practices. While courts often speak of enforcing a
contract, more commonly they are concerned with a slightly different
concept, namely liability. The term itself is suggestive. Liability refers to

181. Charles Fried seemed to adopt this position during his remarks at a recent Suffolk
University Law School conference on the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of Contract as
Promise. Charles Fried, Contract as Promise at 30: Closing Remarks (Mar. 25, 2011) (downloaded
using iTunes).
182. See Shiffrin, Immoral?, supra note 113, at 1557.
183. See generally Oman, supra note 170.
184. See Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603,
1627–34 (2009).
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
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vulnerability rather than coercion or obligation per se. To be liable is to be
exposed to attack from others. Hobbes famously suggested that in the state
of nature life was “nasty, brutish, and short.”186 Anarchic systems, however,
are shot through with mechanisms for maintaining order and cooperation
in the absence of the state.187 The idea of liability is key to understanding
these practices.
According to Hobbes, the problem with the state of nature is its
ubiquitous vulnerability. “Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men
live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that
condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against
every man.”188 Unprotected from predation by others, “there is no place for
Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain . . . and . . . worst of all,
continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary,
poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”189 The solution to this problem, according
to Hobbes, is Leviathan, an omnipotent state that can suppress all private
predation and guarantee security to all. And therein lies the problem.190
Vulnerability has a way of making people cautious toward others.
People who are open to attack tend not to be predatory.191 It is only when
one becomes relatively invulnerable that predation becomes an optimal
strategy. Consider the recurrent pattern in human history of mobile, horsemounted raiders attacking relatively immobile agriculturalists.192 The
predators in this scenario are predators precisely because they can easily run
away when attacked and are thus less vulnerable than their victims. The Cold
War debate over anti-ballistic missile systems hinged on the same issue.193
The fear was that a country that was invulnerable to nuclear attack was far
more likely to become a nuclear aggressor.194
In contrast, consider the practice of giving a hostage as part of a treaty.
The purpose of exchanging hostages was to make the parties to the treaty
permanently vulnerable to one another.195 It was this very vulnerability that

186. HOBBES, supra note 127, at 89.
187. See Oman, supra note 126, at 545.
188. HOBBES, supra note 127, at 88.
189. Id. at 89.
190. See Oman, supra note 126, at 544–51 (arguing that cooperation can be undermined by
systems and situations that render contracting parties invulnerable to one another).
191. See id. at 533.
192. See id. at 547.
193. See JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY 81 (2005) (discussing the
debates over ballistic-missile defense).
194. See id. (noting that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty “was the first formal
acknowledgment, by both sides, of Churchill’s—and Eisenhower’s—idea that the vulnerability
that came with the prospect of instant annihilation could become the basis for a stable, longterm, Soviet-American relationship”).
195. See Oman, supra note 126, at 548.
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acted as the spur to good behavior.196 Modern game theory provides a
similar insight.197 When the prisoner’s dilemma is played as a one-shot game,
the optimal strategy is to defect, in part because the players in the game have
no way of sanctioning those that defect.198 On the other hand, if the game is
played in successive rounds, the parties become vulnerable to one
another.199 If you defect in this round, then I can punish you in the next
round by defecting. A strategy of cooperation coupled with tit-for-tat
retaliation emerges.200 The vulnerability of the parties fosters cooperation
and trust.201
Contractual liability fosters cooperation by making promisors
vulnerable within a framework that otherwise protects them from predation.
It balances the conflicting needs of being secure from attack and avoiding
the invulnerability that can undermine cooperation. The central moral
obligation associated with promising is the obligation to do what one has
promised. The most natural legal analog to this moral obligation is the
principle of pacta sunt servada. This is not, however, what the law of contracts
does. Rather, it provides disappointed promisees with a way of retaliating
against those that break their promises. Contract law makes people
vulnerable, liable. It allows tit-for-tat and, in effect, makes the promisor’s
non-exempt assets a hostage to his performance. Rather than coercing the
performance of a moral obligation to keep one’s promises, contract law is
oriented toward reaping the benefits of the state of nature—the way its
ubiquitous vulnerability makes sanctioning those that renege on their
agreements easy—while avoiding the very pathologies which that
vulnerability creates. The result is a legal institution that extends the reach
of the pre-legal dynamics that make markets possible.
V. CRITICISMS AND LIMITATIONS
Thus far, the structure of this Article’s argument has necessarily led me
to take a celebratory stance towards markets. I believe that such a stance is
justified. In broad historical terms, markets have been an enormously
beneficent influence on human societies. Commerce, on balance, makes our
polities more peaceful, stable, and humane. Its practice tends to make us
into better people. That said, however, it would be the rankest kind of
Panglossianism to assume that markets are always positive in either their
outcomes or their operation. Accordingly, in this section we turn to some of
the central criticisms that can be leveled at markets. The first is that markets

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See id.
See id. at 549.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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result in distributive outcomes that cannot be normatively justified. The
second is that markets are heterogeneous and can sometimes turn
pathological. While I do not believe that either of these objections justifies
rejecting the ultimately positive assessment of markets I have offered thus
far, there is some merit to both of them.
I do not, however, believe that these objections are fatal to the central
thesis of this Article, namely that contract law is best thought of as existing to
support markets because markets are themselves normatively desirable. Even
if one qualifies one’s support of markets by acknowledging their normative
limitations, they can continue to justify contract law so long as we
acknowledge that contract law must be limited so as not to support markets
in their pathological inflection.
A. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Aristotle claimed that distributive justice represents a geometric
principle.202 On first reading, the reference to mathematics seems out of
place, but the philosopher was making an important point about the
structure of justice. In claiming that distributive justice is geometric, he was
not offering a substantive theory of justice. Rather, he was making a claim
about what is at issue in the concept of distributive justice. At its heart,
Aristotle insisted, justice is about a ratio, the ratio between an individual’s
possession of some morally relevant characteristic and that individual’s share
of the desirable things of life.203 A distribution is just when this ratio is the
same for all of the morally relevant members of a society.204 For example,
suppose that one subscribes to a racist theory of distributive justice, whereby
the desirable things of life should be granted in equal shares to those of the
favored race and denied to those of all other races. Now as a substantive
matter, such a theory of justice is false and evil. It is nevertheless identifiable
as a distributive theory. The proper ratio between the theory-relevant
characteristic—race—and the good things of life is maintained for each
individual.
Markets distribute desirable social goods. Indeed, this is one of their
primary functions. A well-worn criticism of markets states that they do so in
distributively unjust ways. Stated in Aristotelian terms, there is no plausible
moral characteristic such that the ratio between that characteristic and the
distribution of the desirable things of life effected by the market holds true
for all members of society. To put some flesh on this abstraction, consider
the case of Carlos Slim Helu, the head of Telmex, the Mexican telecom

202. See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 95–96 (F.H. Peters trans., Barnes & Noble
2004) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (“We see then that which is just is in some sort proportionate.”).
203. See id. (“That which is just, then, requires that there be four terms at least, and that the
ratio between the terms and the same.”).
204. See id.
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giant, who was, according to Forbes, the richest person on the planet in 2012,
with a net worth of $69 billion.205 Helu’s yearly income is roughly $18.5
billion, while the median per capita income in Mexico is roughly $14,800
per year.206 In other words, Helu’s income is over 1,250,000 times greater
than that of his average countryman. It would be very difficult, however, to
imagine any morally relevant characteristic that a person possesses in such
vast quantities relative to others. When markets create such disparities—and
admittedly in Helu’s case his wealth was amassed thanks to significant
intervention by the Mexican state—then they are distributionally unjust.
The distributive attack on markets, however, generally goes beyond
mere skepticism about the possibility of a theory of justice defending market
distributions. Rather, the critique almost always comes from egalitarians who
believe that, at least as a first approximation, the desirable things of life
should be distributed equally to all. Of course, sophisticated egalitarians do
not advocate anything approaching absolute equality, but they do tend to
believe that deviations from an equal distribution are suspect and require
special justification. John Rawls, for example, argued that some of the
inequities of a market system may be justified because they are necessary to
incentivize the creation of wealth, but such inequities can be maintained
only so long as they benefit the least well-off members of society.207
Understood in these terms, the market is presumptively unjust, which would
suggest that standing alone it cannot operate as a moral justification.
There are essentially two ways that this line of argument can be met.
The first approach is to offer a libertarian defense of markets. On this view,
markets are in fact distributionally just, or at least presumptively so. Robert
Nozick offered the most famous modern version of this argument.208
Rejecting what he called “patterned” theories of distributive justice, Nozick
argued that one cannot judge any distribution as just by simply observing its
correspondence with some ideal. Rather, he argued that any distribution is
potentially just as long as it is the result of a series of past transactions that
are voluntary.209 Put in Aristotelian terms, the morally relevant category to
which distributions are to be related is a particular sort of historical

205. See The World’s Billionaires: Carlos Slim Helu & Family, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/
profile/carlos-slim-helu/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
206. See Moguls: Carlos Slim Helu Is World’s Richest Man, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 10, 2010, 2:28 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/cheats/2010/03/10/carlo-slim-helu-is-worlds-richest-man.html;
The World Fact Book: Mexico, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html (last updated Sept. 10, 2012). This number
represents per capita GDP, which is simply GDP divided by population. Because many members
of the population are not wage earners—such as children, women working in the home, etc.—
average income for wage earners is probably somewhat higher. None of this, however, is
relevant to the argument in the text.
207. See RAWLS, supra note 43.
208. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 155–60 (1974).
209. See id. at 155–56.
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pedigree. Hence, in evaluating the justice of Helu’s wealth relative to that of
his countrymen, what should arouse moral concern is not the size of Helu’s
holdings but the means by which he acquired them.210 Provided that the
markets in question conform to Nozick’s conditions of voluntary alienation
of entitlements and respect for individual rights, then the distributions they
produce are by definition just.211
There is also an older, libertarian defense of the justice of market
distribution based on the idea of desert. For example, John Bates Clark, an
American economist writing at the end of the nineteenth century, argued
that in a competitive market all economic inputs—labor, land, and capital—
would be paid according to their marginal productivity.212 The resulting
distributions were just because each person received an amount equal to his
contribution. “To every man his product, his whole product and nothing but
his product,” Clark explained.213
One needn’t accept these libertarian arguments, however, in order to
defend markets from the distributional attack. This is fortunate because
whatever their merits in the abstract, both arguments place very demanding
conditions on markets, conditions that in all likelihood cannot be met in the
real world. Setting aside the very difficult question of voluntariness, given
the historical and contemporary ubiquity of various forms of expropriation,
it is unlikely that the exacting historical conditions necessary for Nozick’s
theory can be met.214 Likewise, even if Clark’s economic analysis is correct
and perfectly competitive markets give to each person the marginal value of
their productive contributions, it is still true—as I argued above—that the
conditions for perfectly competitive markets are seldom, if ever, realized in
the real world.
Other defenses of markets, however, are available. Consider the second
theorem of welfare economics. As noted above, the first theorem states that
the final distribution of goods and services in a competitive market will be

210. See id. at 28–29.
211. See id. at 29.
212. See BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND
THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 1–2 (1998) (describing Clark’s economic and
moral theories). Clark defended his claims most fully in JOHN BATES CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION
OF WEALTH (Augustus M. Kelley rprt. 1965) (1899).
213. See FRIED, supra note 212, at 2 (quoting John Bates Clark, The Law of Wages and Interest,
1 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 43, 44 (1890)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
214. The issue of what counts as a voluntary transfer is conceptually difficult. As critics of
laissez faire have long argued, the seemingly voluntary transactions of the market can be
characterized as coercive. See id. at 29–70 (discussing “The Empty Idea of Liberty”). To his
credit, Robert Nozick has offered one of the most sophisticated modern expositions of the
problems associated with the idea of voluntariness, as well as his own theory of what counts as a
voluntary transaction. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, SOCRATIC PUZZLES 15–44 (1997)
(containing Nozick’s “study of coercion”).
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Pareto-optimal and will result from a series of Pareto-superior moves.215 The
second theorem is a corollary to it, namely that any final, Pareto-optimal
distribution can be achieved in an efficient market by manipulating the
initial distribution of goods and services.216 It seems plausible to suppose
that any reasonable theory of distributive justice will defend a Pareto-optimal
distribution. This does not mean, of course, that Pareto optimality is itself a
theory of distributive justice. Many distributionally unjust outcomes could be
Pareto-optimal. I only mean to suggest that Pareto optimality is a necessary,
but not a sufficient, condition for a fair distribution. This is, of course, a very
weak constraint on distributional theories. It means only that we cannot
regard a change in distribution that leaves at least one person better off
while leaving no one worse off as an injustice.217 If this is correct, then the
second theorem suggests that in an efficient market any reasonably just
distribution may be achieved, so long as the initial entitlements are properly
adjusted ex ante.
Of course this ex ante argument requires that we have perfectly efficient
markets, or alternatively, markets that are sufficiently efficient to result in
Pareto-optimal distributions. This condition may not be met. It is, however,
possible to make distributional adjustments ex post to market results in
order to reach desired outcomes. This is a variation of an argument that is
habitually made by efficiency proponents of the market. They argue, in
effect, that markets should be ordered so as to maximize joint profit, even if
one believes that the resulting distribution will be perverse as a matter of
justice. This is because it is always possible after the fact to redistribute
wealth via taxes and transfer payments.
In the real world, the distinction between ex ante and ex post
manipulation of entitlements breaks down. This is because social outcomes
are never determined in a neat three-step process of (1) ex ante
distribution; (2) market activity; and (3) ex post redistribution. Rather,
market processes and their alternatives are continuous. In effect, step 2 is
constant, and any action at step 1 could be recharacterized as a step 3 action
and vice versa. Consider state-provided public education. The education
could be thought of as altering the initial ex ante distribution of each actor,
in effect giving each adult additional resources at the starting line of
economic life. Alternatively, public education can be seen as a transfer of

215. See JOHN LEACH, A COURSE IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS 35 (2004) (setting forth the first
theorem of welfare economics).
216. See id. (“Second theorem: Each Pareto optimal allocation is the competitive allocation
under some distribution of the endowed goods.”).
217. Strictly speaking, this may be an even weaker condition than it appears. To be Paretosuperior, a new distribution would need to not only not leave any person worse off in material
terms (i.e., poorer) but also not be disapproved by any one for any other reason. See generally
AMARTYA SEN, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, in CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 285,
285–90 (1982).
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income from wealthy households in the form of taxes to poorer households
in the form of a free service, in effect an ex post redistribution. This
fuzziness needn’t concern us much if our goal is some just distribution
different than the one that the market would otherwise produce. Instead, it
is enough to say that markets needn’t be distributionally perverse—even to
those that reject the libertarian argument for the inherent justness of
market distributions—so long as they are accompanied by various other
forms of distribution that ameliorate their effects.
The question that remains is what impact, if any, the distributive justice
critique of markets should have on the central thesis of this Article. My
answer is: very little. If one subscribes to the libertarian defenses sketched
above, then the distributive outcomes of markets are per se just. My thesis,
however, does not require the defense of such a strong claim. While I do
celebrate the virtues of markets, I am not defending capitalist anarchy in this
Article. My claim is not that markets provide the sole legitimate means of
social or political organization or that they provide a justification for all of
our legal and political institutions. Rather, my claim is that markets provide
the best justification for contract law. This is admittedly an important legal
institution, but it is ultimately one among many. Hence, for my thesis to
survive the distributional critique of markets, all that is necessary is to show
that markets are consistent with most reasonable theories of distributive
justice. For the reasons sketched above, I believe this is a burden that can be
easily met.
B. HETEROGENEITY AND THE PROBLEM OF PATHOLOGICAL MARKETS
Not all markets are the same. One of the effects of modern economics,
especially neo-classical price theory, is to homogenize our view of markets.218
In place of the heterogeneity of actual markets, economics tends to flatten
out the differences between different kinds of markets.219 In place of the
manifest differences between, for example, international securities markets,
the market for locally grown produce, and the market for professional labor,
economics presents iterations on the central theme of prices moving along
supply and demand curves toward an efficient market-clearing price.220
Classical economists from Adam Smith to Karl Marx, however, tended
to emphasize the heterogeneity of markets. Smith famously described the
benefits of specialization and the division of labor using the example of a
pin factory.221 He also worried, however, about the effects of the change
from a labor market dominated by individual craftsmen to a market
218. See DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS OF
MARKETS 44–49 (2010) (discussing “Heterogeneous Markets”).
219. See id.
220. See id. at 17–21 (discussing market efficiency).
221. See id. at 44–45 (discussing Adam Smith’s analysis of the effects of specialization on
laborers).
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dominated by factory workers performing simple and repetitive tasks.222
Smith’s concern was that working lives devoid of the complex tasks faced by
craftsmen would tend to deaden the intellectual facilities of workers,
rendering them unable to meet the demands of citizenship.223 It was a
theme that Marx picked up on in his famous thesis about the alienation of
the worker from the product of his labor and its baleful effects on human
happiness.224 The simplifying and homogenizing approach of modern
economics has yielded considerable analytical insights. Modern price theory
provides a much better model of how value is created in transactions, the
price at which contracts are made, and the way that price distributes value
than do, for example, the clumsy labor theories of value that Smith and
Marx employed. The earlier theories, however, draw attention to the way in
which markets can turn pathological, representing an inversion of
Montesquieu’s doux commerce thesis.
Markets can turn pathological in at least two ways. First, markets may be
structured around the production and distribution of goods and services
that are in some way evil. Consider, for example, a market in child sex. For a
variety of reasons, we should regard child prostitution as evil. The necessarily
dependent status of children renders child prostitution markets even more
prone to violence and abuse than adult prostitution markets. Child
prostitution sexualizes children long before they have the emotional
capacity to deal with sexuality. Other examples of markets in evil goods or
services abound.
A variation on this objection notes that there are certain things that,
while not inherently evil, become undesirable when traded in a market. Sex
is the quintessential example. While some have no per se objection to
prostitution so long as it is fully voluntary and unaccompanied by abuse,
most people believe that there is something inherently wrong about trading
sex for money and money for sex. This belief, however, needn’t imply that
sex engaged in outside of the context of a market transaction is wrong.
Margaret Radin has argued that the law should adopt a market inalienability
rule, refusing to enforce contracts involving the purchase or sale of goods or
services that implicate core matters of identity.225 In other cases, we might
worry that market transactions will crowd out alternative and desirable

222.
223.
224.

See id.
See id.
See Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in THE MARX-ENGELS
READER 66, 96 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (discussing the idea of a worker’s alienation
from the product of his labor).
225. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (setting
forth the argument that certain entitlements should not be alienated within a market); cf. In re
Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), superseded by statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:3-46 (West 2002), as
recognized in In re Adoption of Children by G.P.B., 736 A.2d 1277 (N.J. 1999) (refusing to
enforce a surrogacy contract).
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means of enforcement.226 Similarly, for example, some have claimed that
paying for blood actually reduces the supply of blood donations because it
crowds out voluntary donations.227
The second way that a market might be evil is if the process of exchange
in the market degrades its participants in some way, even if the good or
service traded in the market is not itself evil. Sometimes the response may be
frankly paternalistic. In Lochner v. New York, the state placed restrictions on
the working hours of bakers not because markets in bread were purveying
an evil commodity, but because either disparities in bargaining power or an
inability to perceive their true interests led bakers to work longer hours than
the state determined to be safe.228 Alternatively, one might object to the way
a market alters or reinforces certain social structures. For example, one
might object to a market in indentured servitude because it would tend to
lead to a stratified and status-bound society of servants and masters.229
My object here is not to evaluate the merits of any of the specific
arguments as to why a market is pathological. Rather, let us assume—as
seems to me eminently reasonable—that the set of such pathological
markets is not empty but also does not include all markets. What then
follows for the core claim of this Article that contract law is justified by the
moral desirability of markets? The answer is that it must be qualified. Not all
markets are morally desirable. There are healthy markets and pathological
markets. Contract law, however, is not institutionally well suited to suppress
pathological markets. This is a task better performed—if it is to be
performed at all—by criminal law or regulatory authorities. However, if
contract law’s justification rests in the desirability of markets, then there is
no justification under this theory for enforcing the contracts supporting
pathological markets. Doctrinally, this basic intuition is reflected in the rule
that contracts may be void as violating public policy. Thus, for example,

226. See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of
Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010)
(arguing that formal contract enforcement may crowd out informal mechanisms of
organization).
227. See RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL
POLICY (1971) (arguing that payments for blood donation undermine the propensity to
donate).
228. See Lockner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58–63 (1905), overruled in part by Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 728 (1963) (discussing the state’s interest in restricting the working hours for
New York bakers).
229. See Nathan B. Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth Amendment, 93 MINN. L. REV.
2020 (2009) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits employers from dominating
employees via the enforcement of contractual obligations); see also James Gray Pope, Contract,
Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474
(2010) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude serves
to guarantee egalitarian labor relationships).
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contracts to pay bribes,230 contracts for certain kinds of disfavored medical
procedures,231 contracts to pay gambling debts,232 and contracts to commit a
tort233 will not be enforced.
It is worth noting here that the market-based justification for contract
deals with public-policy limitations on freedom of contract better than
autonomy approaches like the promissory theories discussed above. For
autonomy theories, public-policy exceptions represent a messy intrusion of
foreign values into contract law. By refusing to enforce voluntary
commitments, the law makes a kind of ad hoc compromise with the
libertarian purity of contract. From a market perspective, however, such
limitations flow naturally from the basic normative justification for contract
law. In effect, contract law runs out at the point where its normative
justification runs out. Our goal is not respect for personal autonomy per se
but the moral goods provided by markets. When the enforcement of
contracts fails to provide those goods, the justification for enforcing the
contract also fails.
C. CONTRACT LAW AND PRIMA FACIE JUSTIFICATION
The limitations on the justificatory power of markets discussed in the
previous two sections illustrate an important issue. Contract law is a residual
or background category of law. By this I mean that it constitutes a kind of
global default rule governing obligations arising from voluntary transactions.
This does not mean, of course, that it applies to all voluntary transactions.
Indeed, the central thesis of this Article is that, as a market-sustaining
institution, we have reasons for confining the reach of contract law to
market transactions. Rather, by “residual or background” I mean that
contract law deals with a transaction unless some other body of law displaces
it. Hence, for most market transactions, contract law is both logically and
historically prior to the other bodies of law governing those transactions.
Consider the example of employment contracts. Prior to the rise of modern
employment law in the 1960s, the law of contracts governed most

230. See Sirkin v. Fourteenth St. Store, 108 N.Y.S. 830, 834 (App. Div. 1908) (“I think
nothing will be more effective in stopping the growth and spread of this corrupting and now
criminal custom [of commercial bribery] than a decision that the courts will refuse their aid to
a guilty vendor or vendee . . . .”).
231. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988), superseded by statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. §
9:3-46 (West 2002), as recognized in In re Adoption of Children by G.P.B., 736 A.2d 1277 (N.J.
1999) (holding that surrogacy contracts violated the public policy of New Jersey and could not
be enforced). But see Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (holding that
surrogacy contracts did not violate public policy).
232. See Cudahy Junior Chamber of Commerce v. Quirk, 165 N.W.2d 116, 118 (Wis. 1969)
(refusing to enforce a wagering contract). But see FARNSWORTH, supra note 147, at 351 n.4
(noting that under English common law gaming contracts were generally enforceable).
233. See Sayres v. Decker Auto. Co., 145 N.E. 744, 745 (N.Y. 1924) (holding that a contract
to give a false bill of sale in order to defraud a third party was not enforceable).
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employment relationships. With the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act234
and various other statutes designed to govern employment relations,
however, contract law was displaced on certain issues. Contract, however,
continues to operate in the interstices of employment law, providing the
default rules when the more specialized body of law is silent.
Contract’s status as a background body of law raises a number of
interesting questions. First, there is the question of whether there are special
reasons for favoring the more general principles of contract law over the
more context-specific bodies of law such as employment law or the like.235
Secondly, and for purposes of this Article more importantly, a defense of
contract law needn’t provide a defense of contract law as the best regime to
govern all transactions. Rather, it need only provide a prima facie defense of
contract law. To be sure, the more robust one’s belief in the beneficent
force of relatively unfettered markets, the more likely one is going to be
suspicious of bodies of law that seek to displace market-sustaining regimes,
such as contract law with more regulatory bodies of law.
While I am sympathetic to criticisms of much of our current regulatory
apparatus, however, nothing in the argument that I have offered in this
Article requires such sympathy. In order for markets to justify contract law, it
is enough that one is persuaded that markets are sufficiently valuable to
provide a prima facie reason for legal support and that one is further
persuaded that contract law does in fact provide such support. The fact that
one believes that in some situations markets ought not to be supported does
not defeat the basic thesis. It only means that in those circumstances we lack
a reason for having contract law, and its support for the market in question
ought to be withdrawn.
Once it is recognized that contract law provides a set of background
rules and that what is needed is a prima facie justification for the law, the
case for viewing contract as a market-sustaining institution becomes
stronger. Contractual liability is relatively easy to avoid by simply refusing to
234. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)). Of particular importance is Subchapter VI, Equal Employment
Opportunities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 200e to -e-17.
235. Compare Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 77, 90–91
(2009) (arguing that the generality of contract law solves pubic choice and information
problems faced by more specialized bodies of law), with BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES,
THEORY, AND CONTEXT (2012) (criticizing contract theorists for focusing too much on the
generality of contract law). See also Brian H. Bix, Mahr Agreements: Contracting in the Shadow of
Family Law (and Religious Law)—A Comment on Oman’s Article, 1 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 61,
63–64 (2011), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Forum_Bix.
pdf (arguing that general contract law is poorly situated to police mahr agreements); Nathan B.
Oman, Bargaining in the Shadow of God’s Law: Islamic Mahr Contracts and the Perils of Legal
Specialization, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579, 581–82 (2010) (arguing that the general law of
contracts deals with Islamic marriage contracts better than the more specialized rules
developed for prenuptial agreements); Nathan B. Oman, How To Judge Shari’a Contracts: A Guide
to Islamic Marriage Agreements in American Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 287, 319–31 (same).
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engage in contracts. For that reason, it is not a body of law that is well suited
for controlling or regulating behavior.236 This phenomenon is compounded
by the fact that contract law’s reaction to undesirable contracts is relatively
anemic. For example, rather than trying to suppress prostitution by
punishing those who seek to purchase sex, contract law simply refuses to
recognize meretricious contracts. Only through verbal and conceptual
gymnastics, however, can this response be seen as a punishment or a
sanction against prostitution. Rather, it is a withdrawing of support from that
market. Instead of suppressing pathological markets, contract law tends to
simply run out, refusing to act one way or the other. Such a stance is entirely
consistent with the role of contract law as a market-supporting institution,
and it is the way in which the value of markets provides a prima facie
justification for contract.
The argument offered in this Article is not libertarian. It is laudatory of
markets and provides reasons for celebrating and protecting them. It is not,
however, offered as a brief for radical free-market politics or anarchocapitalism. It may be consistent with such ideologies, but to say that markets
are good is not to say that they are always good or that they are the only
good. Rather, this Article is offered as a brief for contract law, a body of rules
that provides a default regime supporting markets, but a regime that may be
pushed aside when we decide that particular markets are not desirable. My
goal is not to provide a set of arguments specifying the structure of society as
a whole, only a set of arguments specifying the basic domain of contract law.
VI. CONCLUSION
Markets provide the moral foundations for contract law. The
widespread process of exchange does more than efficiently allocate
resources. Indeed, it is far from clear that real-world markets result in the
formally efficient allocation of resources. Markets do, however, perform a
host of other morally valuable functions. They allow for widespread
cooperation among those with often violently different religious and moral
beliefs. They generate wealth, which not only decreases material suffering
but is positively correlated with such desirable social outcomes as religious
tolerance, better treatment of women and racial minorities, and greater
concern for the natural world. The claim here is not that wealth is either a
sufficient or a necessary condition for these outcomes. Rather, it is the more
modest argument that wealth often shifts society in these directions and
that, to the extent that markets facilitate this process even in part, they are to
be desired. Finally, markets inculcate certain habits of mind and behavior
that are to be desired. Given the benefits that flow from markets, we have

236. But see Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract
Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 699 (1990) (arguing that contract law serves to control and
regulate contracting parties).
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good reason for creating bodies of law that serve to sustain and strengthen
markets. This is what contract law does.
Looking at markets rather than directly at personal moral obligations,
such as the duty to keep a promise, allows us to better navigate some basic
theoretical problems that any system of contract law will face. It gives us an
answer as to why promissory obligations are picked out from the universe of
moral obligations for legal enforcement. They are favored not because we
want to facilitate promise keeping but because doing so facilitates markets. It
also gives us guidance as to which promises we want to enforce and the
remedial structure of that enforcement. In each case, focusing on the moral
obligation to keep a promise leads to confusion, while looking at markets as
the goal of contract law provides a better guide to legal structure. Finally,
the fact that in some circumstances markets can be pathological does not
undermine this Article’s central thesis. It only means that in those areas we
lack a reason for supporting markets through contract law, and accordingly,
the law should be limited. In short, markets should be placed at the center
of the justification of contract law. Contract is the law of the market.

